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LEARNING FROM CRIME DRAMAS: THE ROLE OF PRESENCE AND
TRANSPORTATION IN ATTITUDE CHANGE
BRIDGET E. RUBENKING
ABSTRACT
As the authors of the Transportation-Imagery Model (Green & Brock, 2000;
2002) often state, much attention has been paid to the effects of persuasive
communications, frequently at the cost of studying the effects that narratives have on
individuals’ real-world beliefs. This study is primarily interested in examining the role
that transportation and presence – along with a host of related variables – play in
individuals adopting story-consistent beliefs based on entertainment narratives. A
secondary goal of the study is to explore the similarities and differences between
transportation (Green & Brock, 2000) and presence (Lombard & Ditton, 1997; Wirth et
al. 2007; Biocca 2002, Witmer & Singer, 1998).
A review of previous literature documents that individuals learn from fiction – the
realm of entertainment-education is just one example. If people can change their attitudes
and behavior based on pro-social messages, examining whether, and under what
conditions, this can occur with antisocial, or unjustly stereotypical content should be
further explored. This experimental research is interested in what variables affect
attitudes toward the mentally ill, based on their typical violent and criminal
representations in a crime drama.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the control condition, in which they
viewed a crime drama with no reference to mental illness, or to the experimental
condition, in which they viewed a crime drama that centers around a man who’s
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schizophrenia serves as the reason he is a violent murderer. Participants viewed one of
these episodes, and then responded to a questionnaire. Measures included counterarguing with the narrative, transportation into the narrative (Green & Brock, 2000), three
dimension of presence: spatial, engagement (mental immersion), and social realism
(Lombard & Ditton, 2000), perceived realism (Green, 2004), familiarity/personal
experience with the mentally ill, and attitudes toward the mentally ill. A second time
point measure of attitudes toward the mentally ill was administered 2-3 weeks after the
initial viewing and questionnaire, in an attempt to further understand the longevity of
narrative-based attitude change.
Results demonstrate many similarities between transportation and presence,
particularly the engagement (mental immersion) dimension of presence and
transportation (r=.599, p<.010). Perceived realism was also related to transportation and
engagement, such that the more real content was deemed, participants experienced
greater transportation and presence. No main effect was found for the experimental
manipulation, nor was transportation and presence then tied to attitude change. However,
attitudes at the second time of measure were significantly more favorable toward the
mentally ill than at the first time of measure. Theoretical implications are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

Crime dramas are a genre of television show that has seemingly only increased in
popularity in recent years. Individuals are drawn to crime dramas for a number of
reasons. Shows like CSI top the ratings, and the original Law & Order has completed its
eighteenth season: the mainstays of the genre are still attracting large and often desirable
young audiences. If one of those shows does not satisfy one’s want for crime and drama,
there are two more shows each within the CSI and Law & Order franchises available for
viewing, along with a host of other shows Shark, Cold Case, Criminal Minds, NCIS,
Numbers, Shark, Women’s Murder Club, Without a Trace – and those are just on network
programming.
Despite this popularity, we do not know the nature of the influence this type of
fictional content has on real-world beliefs. The influence of variables associated with the
viewer, as well as those associated with the form and content of the narrative
programming may be great. Three broad reasons for studying the conditions under which
fiction can have an influence over individuals has been put forth by Green, Garst, and
Brock (2004). First, understanding the potential use of fiction to intentionally persuade
could be beneficial for a host of entertainment-education goals. Secondly, individuals
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may be persuaded by false informational content when they should not be. Lastly, there is
much to be gained from learning how individuals approach imagination and reality,
reality and truth. This study is interested in the last two of these three reasons.
Statement of Problem
Fictional television programming has the potential to change attitudes and beliefs
about the real world, and the experience that viewers have of watching such content is an
essential part of how attitude change may occur. It has been demonstrated that individuals
learn about the real world from fictional content and apply it to their real-world beliefs
(Green & Brock, 2000; Slater, Rouner, & Long, 2006; Appel & Richter, 2007; Busselle
& Bilandzic, 2006). This study attempts to demonstrate that attitudes can be changed
based on viewing crime dramas in a way that reinforces negative stereotypes about the
mentally ill.
In addition to general questions about attitude change based on television crime
narratives, understanding the role that transportation (Green & Brock, 2000; 2002; Green,
Garst & Brock, 2004) and presence (Lombard & Ditton, 1997; Biocca, 2002; Wirth et al.,
2007) play in attitude change is of paramount importance to this study. Will those who
feel more transported into the story world show greater attitude change, as the researchers
behind the transportation-imagery model would predict? Can the overlaps in the
theoretical constructs between transportation, and several dimension of presence,
including spatial presence, engagement (mental immersion), and social realism, be
demonstrated through the data? Will presence influence attitude change as it has been
demonstrated to do with persuasive messages (Skalski & Tamborini, 2007; Kim &
Biocca, 1997)?
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This research is also concerned with the mediating role that perceived realism and
personal familiarity with mental illness will play. It is theorized that the more familiar
one is with mental illness in their personal lives, the more the negative portrayal of the
mentally ill in the crime drama will seem less real or plausible. This decrease in
perceived realism that those with more familiarity or experience with mental illness will
sense may lead to a less immersive experience, and a lack of adopting story-consistent
beliefs may become apparent. Lastly, will attitude change based on the narrative persist
over time? What variables will affect the longevity of learned beliefs from crime dramas?
Rationale
Numerous content analyses have documented the ways in which the mentally ill
are misrepresented, most notably as dangerous, unpredictable, and violent (Signorelli,
1989, Wahl & Roth, 1982; Diefenbach, 1997). In fact, the mentally ill are the single most
violent and victimized group on television (Gerbner, 1998). This study is primarily
concerned with mental illness as psychiatric disorders or diseases that impair an
individuals’ thought, mood, or behavior. A problem exists if these negative portrayals
have effects on real world beliefs. The literature surrounding transportation and narrative
(Green & Brock, 2000, Prentice, Gerrig & Bailis, 1997; Dal Cin, Zanna, & Fong, 2004)
suggests it is likely that individuals learn something from the entertainment narratives
they surround themselves with. Studies examining the use of narrative in entertainmenteducation have demonstrated that individuals may change attitudes and behavior based
on narratives when pro-social messages are present (Slater & Rouner 2002; Whittier,
Kennedy, St. Lawrence, Seely, & Beck, 2005). It it logical to attempt to gauge the
unintentional negative attitudes that entertainment narratives may perpetuate as well.
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In addition to attitude change based on narratives, linking the concepts of
transportation and presence is an essential part of this research, which will hopefully add
much to the literature in this field. Some researchers have linked the two concepts
theoretically (Bracken, 2005), while others have made distinctions between the two
(Busselle & Bilandzic, 2006). The feelings of being absorbed, transported, and immersed
are similar in each, and it will be very interesting to see how the two measures of what
may be the same experience compare. This study is proposing that transportation and
feelings of presence should be very similar, and that increased feelings of both will lead
to greater attitude change.There has been some discussion within the presence
community to adopt the term telepresence, a phrase frequently used to also describe the
feeling of “being there” in a mediated environment, in order to place emphasis on the role
that the media or technology plays in the process. This study has chosen to use the term
presence as a way to minimize confusion and changes in terms between sources.
Perceived reality has been demonstrated to increase both transportation (Green,
2004; Busselle & Bilandzic, 2007) and presence (Witmer & Singer, 1998, Balakrishnan,
Nikolic, & Zikic, 2007). The relationship between perceived reality and personal
familiarity or experience is expected to be such that those with increased familiarity with
mental illness will exhibit decreased feelings of perceived reality. Clearly defining and
measuring familiarity or personal experience with a topic in media content, as well as
perceived realism, is necessary in order to examine the role this variable plays in the
processing of such content and resulting attitude change.
The following review of the literature will explore past research and theory
related to all the key variables in this study. Understanding the similarities between the
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transportation-imagery model and presence, and the role that they play in the cognitive
processing of narratives and resulting attitude change is of paramount importance to this
study. First, the theoretical development and support for the transportation-imagery
model will be discussed. Following the discussion of variables that are of interest to
researchers of narratives, presence and persuasion will be a review of literature on the
processing of fictional texts. A discussion on attitude change over time as a result of
exposure to a narrative, entertainment-education and stigmatizing portrayals of mental
illness on television completes the second chapter.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Perspectives
Transportation-Imagery Model.
The transportation-imagery model (TIM) posits that the extent to which
individuals become absorbed into a story or transported into a narrative world, they may
show effects of the story on their real-word beliefs (Green & Brock, 2000). Green and
Brock (2000) define narrative as “a story that raises unanswered questions, presents
unresolved conflicts, or depicts [a] not yet completed activity; characters encounter and
then resolve a crisis or crises. A story line, with a beginning, middle and an end, is
identifiable” (p.701). It is argued that these characteristics of narratives make them more
likely to produce greater transportation. Other researchers have defined narratives to fit
their research goals, such as Rowe Stitt and Nabi (2005) who define narratives as
“messages with a plot, sub-plot, and character development” (p.11).
In the realm of health-based narratives, a combination of definitions of narratives
has been used, such as stories that contain episodes that feature goals, plans, acts or
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outcomes. These narratives should ideally be powerful and compelling, and typically
provide easily understood case histories (Kopfman, Smith, Ah Yun, & Hodges, 1998).
Green and Brock (2000) argue that persuasion scholars have exerted too much
effort on the study of advocacy messages at the cost of neglecting narratives. Narratives
command far more attention than advertisements and rhetoric in our everyday lives, and
as their example of Uncle Tom’s Cabin demonstrates, these narratives have tremendous
potential to influence attitudes and change beliefs. Brock, Strange and Green (2002)
propose that narrative impact has been largely taken for granted. Neither the consumers
nor producers of public narratives appear to be interested in the underlying processes that
result in attitude change. Although censorship of narratives that are deemed dangerous
has been present throughout time, psychologists have largely left the potential impact of
stories unstudied (Brock et al., 2002), although literature in the area is growing. There are
inherent differences between fictional narratives, which are usually written for
entertainment (Bryant & Miron, 2002), and rhetoric that is meant to persuade an audience
about a product, service, issue, or candidate. Although, it should still be noted that
advertisers frequently employ narrative structure in campaigns (Green & Brock, 2000), as
do health campaigns (Kopfman et al., 1998) and news outlets (Brock et al., 2002). In fact,
one study has shown that the employment of narrative devices in television news stories
increased comprehension and retention (Machill, Kohler, & Waldhauser, 2007).
Green and Brock postulate this attitude change may occur through what they term
“transportation” (Green & Brock, 2000; 2002). Transportation is dependent upon both
characteristics of the narrative itself and characteristics of the individual who is
experiencing the narrative. Transportation consists of three parts, all measured in the
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transportation-imagery scale: attention, feelings, and imagery (Green & Brock, 2000;
Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004). Measures of transportation and enjoyment of media
are often highly correlated, which is due in part to transportation being thought of as a
desired state by many individuals (Green et al., 2004). The construct of transportation is
based in part on Nell’s (1988) concept of “being lost in a story,” as well as the traveler
metaphor, wherein a traveler goes to a different place (that of a mediated reality) and
returns a changed person, offered by Gerrig (1993). Both Gerrig (1993) and Nell (1988)
use terms such as “transportation,” “absorption,” and “entrancement” in their descriptions
of what readers allow themselves to feel while experiencing narratives.
Transportation refers to how absorbed or transported into a story a person may
become, and the extent to which their real world beliefs change as a result of the story.
Individuals may lose access to some real-world facts while experiencing the narrative and
adopt beliefs that the narrative encourages instead (Green & Brock, 2000). Green and
Brock (2000) treat transportation as a convergent process, “where all mental systems and
capacities become focused on events occurring in the narrative” (p.702). These authors
argue that transportation is a distinct mental process, different from the dual-processing
models, such as the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and the
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; 1986). While the amount
of attention and critical thinking about the message is a key factor in determining how
individuals process content in these models, Green and Brock (2000) posit that the
immersion of individuals into a text produces a different processing mechanism. While
the dual process models are well suited for rhetoric and advertisements, transportation is
more likely to occur in response to narratives, for a number of specified and supported
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reasons. Possibly, transported individuals become both cognitively and emotionally
involved with the story (Green, 2004). While much of the older theorizing on narrative
and transportation are done with readers of texts (Nell, 1988, Gerrig, 1993, Green &
Brock, 2000), the authors behind the transportation-imagery model state that
transportation can occur across mediums and when narratives are presented as fact or
fiction (Green & Brock, 2000). More recent research has emerged that uses the concepts
of narrative, transportation and attitude change utilizing film (Busselle & Bilandzic,
2007; Dal Cin et al., 2004), television dramas (Slater et al., 2006), video public service
announcements (Tal-Or, Boninger, Poran, & Gleicher, 2004), and mixed text and video
public service announcements (Rowe Stitt & Nabi, 2005). Story and narrative have been
found to increase enjoyment and immersion in video games as well (Schneider, Lang,
Shin & Bradley, 2004; Lee, Jin, Park, & Kang, 2004).
The original study that accompanied Green and Brocks’ (2000) seminal piece
about the Transportation-Imagery Model examined transportation effects on participants
who read a vivid, gruesome narrative about a psychiatric patient murdering a young girl
at a shopping mall. Regardless of whether the newspaper article was presented as fact or
fiction, participants who reported higher rates of transportation also reported that violence
was more likely to occur in real life, and that psychiatric patients’ freedoms should be
restricted. Highly transported participants also expressed greater story-consistent beliefs
about the world being unfair. All three of these attitude measures were based on implicit
issues in the story itself. The other three studies presented in this piece found similar
results: higher levels of transportation correlating with increased agreement with storyconsistent beliefs (Green & Brock, 2000).
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Prior to the transportation-imagery model, others studied and theorized about
narrative processing. Many researchers agree that a key part of understanding the
processing of narratives is the tendency for audiences to suspend disbelief when learning
new things. Gilbert (1991) draws on the work of Spinoza to support his thesis that the
comprehension and acceptance of ideas are not two different acts – comprehension
includes acceptance of what is comprehended. Gilbert concludes that “People are very
credulous creatures who find it very easy to believe and very difficult to doubt” (p.117).
Further studies found that when readers of true and untrue statements, which were labeled
as such, were distracted or under a demanding time constraint, they believed more of the
untrue statements than did a control group (Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993).
Presence.
The importance of immersion is notable both in the transportation imagery model
and presence. Dimensions of presence are often divided in two – one of which being the
physical, a sense of being in or near the medium, and the other being the social, or the
dimension that reflects a sense of being close to another person or social entity (Bracken
& Lombard, 2004). Here, we will use the following definition of presence,
Presence (a shortened version of the term telepresence) is a
psychological state or subjective perception in which even though part
or all of an individual's current experience is generated by and/or filtered
through human-made technology, part or all of the individual's
perception fails to accurately acknowledge the role of the technology in
the experience. (International Society for Presence Research, 2000, ¶ 2).
When the distinction between social and spatial presence is not made, presence is
often operationalized as a physical sense of being there, and more broadly, “the
perceptual illusion of non-mediation” (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Spatial presence is
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characterized by the feeling of being located in a mediated environment (Wirth et al.,
2007). Mental models are at the heart of how individuals experience spatial presence, as
people in a mediated environment use previously held information and the information
provided to develop a spatial model of their surroundings (Wirth et al., 2007). Presence
can be felt in any medium, from virtual reality to books. Others have more narrowly
defined the concept as “actually being in the same room” (Towell & Towell, 1997, p.
591).
Several of Lombard and Ditton’s (1997) dimensions of presence are related to a
physical sense of being there, most clearly under the description of presence as spatial
presence or transportation; the feeling that “You are there.” Similarly, Wirth et al. (2007)
define spatial presence as, “A binary experience, during which perceived self-location
and, in most cases, perceived action possibilities are connected to a mediated
environment instead of reality” (p.497). However, Lee (2004) gives a typology that
defines physical presence as an experience that does not hinge on immersion in the
environment, but rather is dependent upon technology users not noticing the “paraauthentic nature of mediated objects (or environments)” (p. 45). It is important to note
that both media form and user variables are the two main contributing factors to presence.
Lombard and Ditton (1997) provide some form variables, such as the number and
consistency of sensory outputs, and a variety of visual display characteristics, such as
image quality, image size and viewing distance, motion and color, dimensionality, and
camera techniques. They also cite stimuli beyond the traditional visual auditory, such as
interactivity, social realism, use of media conventions, and the nature of the task or
activity.
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A number of user variables also come into play, although there is less consensus
on how user variables tend to affect presence. Willingness to suspend disbelief among
individuals, as well as knowledge of and experience with the medium, may influence the
sense of presence generated (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). User enjoyment or interest in the
content at hand may also influence presence, as may personal familiarity or experience
with the content or modality. Similar to Busselle and Bilandzic’s (2006) work that shows
an increased willingness or tendency to be transported led to increased feelings of
transportation, Sas and O’Hare (2003) found that individuals more willing to be
transported to the virtual world experienced a greater sense of presence. In a study of
presence in virtual environments, Sas and O’Hare (2003) identified other user
characteristics that led to increased feelings of presence, such as greater absorption
tendencies, creative imagination, empathy and a proclivity to enjoy fantasy content.
As with many studies that involve presence, there are certain dimensions of the
construct that are of more interest than others to the current research. Of Lombard and
Ditton’s (1997) six original dimensions of presence, this study is interested in three.
The first dimension is spatial presence, and here, we are concerned with the concept of
“you are there” (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). This concept of transporting users to remote
places, via virtual reality, video games, television and other mediated forms, often labeled
spatial presence, is the most common or most well-known conceptualization of presence.
Biocca (2002) and Kim and Biocca (1997) discuss presence as departure and arrival from
a specific place. Being there, he maintains, occurs in moments when “we are pushed
through the medium to sensations that approach direct experience” (p. 102).
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While transportation is concerned with a sense of physical movement into a
mediated environment and mental models of the space one is occupying occurs (Wirth et
al., 2007), immersion as a dimension of presence includes the psychological components
of being involved, absorbed, engaged and engrossed (Lombard & Ditton, 1997).
Immersion is often studied in the context of how involved all of an individuals’ senses
may be.
The last of these is perceived realism, which consists of two different types of
realism: social realism and perceptual realism. Social realism is similar to Potter’s (1998)
magic window, and is characteristic of how plausible and true to life a media portrayal
may be (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). The second component, perceptual realism, deals
with characters or settings that may be implausible, but appear in the mediated context as
if they really do exist. Others have made distinctions between narrative and external
realism (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2006); perceived reality in relation to typicality vs.
atypicality of content (Shapiro & Chock, 2003). Media environments high in realism are
more conducive to feelings of presence.
Similarities between presence and transportation
Admittedly, transportation is similar to a number of psychological constructs. One
concept that Green (2004) cites is flow, a state that can be reached when an individual
loses awareness of one’s self as a social actor, becomes absorbed in a goal-oriented
activity, and the balance between skill of the user and difficulty of the task makes the
activity enjoyable (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, Sherry, 2004). Absorption (Tellegen, 1982
cited in Green, 2004) is another related construct (Green, 2004). The similarities between
transportation and presence, or telepresence (Lombard & Ditton, 1997; Wirth et al., 2007;
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Minsky, 1980) are best exemplified through the similar variables that are used to produce
increased or feelings of both constructs. Perceived realism, enjoyment, and modality are
variables that research in both fields has examined, and often found very similar findings
for their effects on transportation and presence.
Indeed, presence as transportation is one dimension of Lombard and Ditton’s
(1997) six dimensions of presence. However, transportation is only one of many
dimensions of presence, and notably, while transportation shares similarities with spatial
presence, the feeling of being there,” it does not tap dimensions of social presence, the
feeling of “we are together,” or self presence (Bracken, 2005). Bracken (2005) states that
both concepts focus on “the perceptual process by which media users are willing to
ignore and transcend the technology they are using to access the content,” (p.127). There
is a distinct trend in the presence literature to focus on form variables; research in the
transportation tradition often focuses on variables related to specific content. Research in
both fields has begun to look at user-side variables as well.
A discussion about transportation and presence would be incomplete without
presenting the complexities of the “book problem” (Biocca, 2002). Biocca (2002)
chronicles the beginning of presence as being derived from explaining and designing
advanced media to increase feelings of immersion and decrease reminders of the real
environment. He states that a similar goal of narrative experiences is to immerse the mind
of the interactor into the narrative world, and the achievement of this psychological
process can be termed presence. Schubert and Crusius (2002) argue that the common
assumption in presence research, that the better technical immersion that is available (e.g.
better quality, real time, field of view), the more presence will be felt, is faulty in
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explaining the “book problem.” These authors claim that presence is not a direct function
of immersion; rather that immersion is dependent upon the source of a stimuli with which
users create a mental model. It is the mental model that individuals create – which,
theoretically could be based on cues in virtual reality, television or books – that
determines whether or not presence is felt (Schubert & Crusius, 2002).
Schubert and Crusius (2002) posit that presence has been studied in different
contexts under different names. These include the “diegetic effect” in film (Burch, 1979;
Tan, 1996) and “transportation” in narrative (Gerrig, 1993; Green & Brock, 2000). An
important thesis put forth by Schubert and Crusius (2002) is that by differentiating
between the construction of a spatial mental model and the attention devoted to this
construction, some differences can be seen between modalities. Virtual reality, for
instance, has a high potential for both construction of mental models, and therefore
spatial presence, and for involvement (or attention), while literature has a high potential
for involvement, but a weaker potential than both films and virtual reality for spatial
presence (Schubert & Crusius, 2002).
Much of the presence literature has studied form, rather than content variables
(such as narrative) that bring about feelings of presence. However, Lee et al. (2004)
examined the effect of exposure to a narrative about a video game before playing on
presence and enjoyment. In one experiment, viewing a 5-minute narrative about the
protagonist of a video game increased presence, enjoyment and their evaluation of the
game. In a second experiment, participants read either a narrative about the game or
technological information about the game. The same results were found for the text
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narrative as the video narrative, with less presence and enjoyment reported by those who
read the non-narrative, technical information.
Others have studied presence and persuasion. Kim and Biocca (1997) found that
the feeling of being there (or arrival) seemed to simulate a real-world experience and
generate attitude confidence. They found that participants exposed to a 15-minute
infomercial were more confident in brand preference and buying intention when they had
a feeling of “being there” in the environment. Thus, Kim and Biocca (1997) conclude that
persuasion via mediated messages can be improved by evoking a sense of presence. In a
study of 3-D advertising viewed on a computer screen, Li, Daugherty, and Biocca (2001)
found that increased feelings of presence resulted in significantly greater product
knowledge and brand attitudes in individuals who had watched 3-D advertising as
compared to the 2-D advertising, which brought about less presence. Skalski and
Tamborini (2007) found that social presence increased positive attitudes toward both
attractive and unattractive social actors, and increased the motivation to process message
content. It is interesting to note that most, if not all, studies of presence and persuasion
have looked at intentionally persuasive mediated content. Looking at attitude change due
in part to feelings of presence while being exposed to entertainment narratives should
serve as an interesting comparison.
Variables similar in transportation and presence
Vividness.
The vividness of a narrative is expected to increase transportation (Green &
Brock, 2000). Of the 15 transportation scale items, the last four are “While reading the
narrative, I had a vivid image of _______,” where the blank is filled with characters in
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the narrative. Others have condensed these into one item that generalizes the vividness of
all the characters presented (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2006). While Green and Brock
operationalize vividness as visual imagery, other conceptualizations in the presence
literature have offered more complex definitions.
Steuer (1995) defines vividness as “the representational richness of a mediated
environment as defined by its formal features, that is, the way in which an environment
presents information to the senses” (p.11). Vividness is dependent upon breadth, or the
ability of a medium to present information across the senses, and upon sensory depth,
which can be understood as being of better quality (e.g. HDTV vs. Standard Definition
TV). Support has been shown for individuals reporting greater social presence after
viewing more “vivid” content on television as opposed to reading a print version of the
same content (Skalski & Tamborini, 2005).
Modality.
According to Steuer’s (1995) standards regarding vividness, narratives that
appear on-screen would lead to greater presence, or immersion, than text narratives.
Green (2004) maintains that the modality that induces a greater sense of transportation is
up for debate, although she speaks to the advantages that books have of “allowing more
imaginative investment from the individual as well as being self-paced (p.252),” which
should increase transportation. However, Gerrig and Prentice (1996) argue that the
formal properties of film allow it to more easily command viewers’ attention, which
increases immersion.
In a study that employed a long text narrative condition, a short text narrative
condition, and a video condition of the same narrative, no differences in transportation
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were found across modalities, although persuasion did differ (Rowe Stitt & Nabi, 2005).
Dal et al. (2004) tested four narratives, including two of the texts used by Green and
Brock, (2000) “Murder at the Mall,” a story of the gruesome killing of a child by a
psychiatric patient, and “Two Were Left,” a survival story about an Inuit boy and his dog
that triumphs friendship. They also used professionally shortened versions of two films, A
Time to Kill, which is the story of an African-American man on trial for killing two white
men who sexually assaulted and beat his daughter, and Norma Rae, a story about a
woman who ultimately is fired for her commitment to unionize the Southern textile plant
she works in. Similar to Rowe Stitt and Nabi’s (2005) study of text and video narratives
about the dangers of driving drunk, Dal Cin et al. (2004) found that while the highest
transportation was reported for A Time to Kill, the lowest transportation was reported for
the other video, Norma Rae. Both text narratives brought about more transportation than
Norma Rae. These findings led the author to conclude that in addition to individual
differences, the structures and perhaps quality of the narratives themselves played a
larger role in transportation than did the modality upon which they were conveyed. In this
case, when vividness is defined by visual imagery, more vivid narratives may have
increased transportation.
Although Chaiken and Eagly’s (1976) study of comprehension and persuasion
used non-narrative, intentionally persuasive communication (legal arguments), their
findings regarding the influence of modality are interesting. They manipulated texts such
that participants in some conditions read or watched difficult to understand arguments,
while others read or watched easy to understand arguments. Results showed that difficult
messages were more easily comprehended and more persuasive in text format, while easy
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messages were most persuasive when videotaped, then listened to on audiotape, and
finally as a written text. Comprehension was the same across all three modalities for easy
to understand messages. Chaiken and Eagly’s (1976) original model proposed that better
comprehension would lead to more persuasion, and that persuasion would be diminished
by distractions.
Identification, Personal relevance, familiarity and prior experience.
One component of narratives is the important role of the protagonist. Character
credibility and likeability are essential to producing attachments to said characters (Green
& Brock, 2000). This attachment is critical to transportation and belief change based on
the narrative. Green and Brock (2000) state, “Readers may not only enter a narrative
world, they may also become highly involved with the people they find there” (p. 702).
Indeed, others have discussed the role that identification with characters in a narrative
plays on both transportation and the success of a narrative itself. Cohen (2001) claims
that identifying with characters is the central mechanism of media effects, that if
individuals don’t identify with anyone committing violence in the media, that portrayal of
violence will have no effect. Cohen (2001) says that identification occurs when an
individual imagines him or herself as a character and becomes less aware of him, or
herself. Identification “is marked by internalizing a point of view rather than a process of
projecting one’s own identity onto someone or something else” (p.252). It is this
definition that Busselle and Bilandzic (2006) use in their study of identification,
transportation and perceived realism. These authors draw connections between
identification with characters and transportation, identification with perceived realism of
the story, and identification and enjoyment. Their results showed significant and sizeable
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correlations between identification and affinity, identification and transportation, and
identification and enjoyment of the narrative. Busselle and Bilandzic (2006) state that
identifying with characters lets audiences experience condensed emotional experiences
that only the fictional world can offer.
In one of the few discussions on the similarities and differences between
transportation and presence, Busselle and Bilandzic (2006) point to identification as a
state or ability that differentiates transportation from concepts such as flow and presence.
They posit that adopting the point of view offered by a story is distinctive of processing
of narratives (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2006; Cohen, 2001). The authors state, “Being able
to relate to a character’s interpretations of the world and its events, understanding
emotions that are implied by the story and adopting causality that is implied by the story,
is what separates experiential engagement into narrative from other immersive
experiences” (p. 5).
A number of variables related to personal familiarity have been examined in
relation to narratives and attitude change. Wheeler, Green, and Brock (1999) repeated
studies performed by Prentice et al. (1997) that looked at the relationship between
personal relevance and attitude change. In both studies individuals read stories that
discussed 15 real-world topics, half of which presented recognizably false ideas, such as
“Sunlight is good for your skin,” and “Most forms of mental illness are contagious.”
Participants were told either that the story about undergraduates included 15 true or false
statements took place at either their own school, thus making it more personally relevant,
or another university far away. Prentice et al. (1997) found support for their hypothesis
that the closer the narrative is to one’s own real-world experience (same school
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condition), the more motivated one is to critically evaluate the information and reject
ideas that are obviously false in the real world. However, Wheeler et al. (1999) found that
individuals scrutinized the story most relevant to them more so than the away-school
setting, but students were equally likely to reject false assertions across conditions.
Some researchers have demonstrated through experiments matching consistent
point of view verbs (e.g. come/go versus bring/take) that both adults and children
construct models of narratives with the protagonist’s point of view or perspective (Black,
Turner, & Bower, 1979; Rall & Harris, 2000).
Some have studied the related construct of involvement, which includes the
concepts of identification and empathy in the study of feelings toward fictional characters
(Raney & Bryant, 2002; Konijn & Hoorn, 2005). In the area of crime programming,
Raney and Bryant (2002) also distinguish between the often-studied emotional responses
to content and characters and the less-studied cognitive inputs (such as “perceptions
about the propriety or legality of action, attitudes toward justice and punishment” (p.405).
Cognitive judgments about issues presented then may be independent of identification or
empathy with characters. This distinction is useful to the current study, which is
concerned less with feelings about individual characters, and more about judgments about
issues in the narrative. While Raney and Bryant (2002) study feelings and judgments
about fictional characters in crime dramas and their impact on enjoyment,
conceptualizing involvement is also necessary in the study of attitude change based on
the characters and plot developments in crime dramas.
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Experience/Familiarity Rationale
Identification, familiarity, and involvement are all important variables to
experiencing a narrative. Green (2004) uses the term “familiarity” to describe a particular
background of a reader that may affect the reader’s ability to identify with the story. She
states that in addition to character traits that individuals may be more familiar with,
“Individuals who have prior familiarity with story themes may be more motivated to
immerse themselves in the story due to intrinsic interest or may have an easier time
imagining story events” (p. 250). Green’s (2004) study found support that familiarity and
closeness to two differing groups present in the narrative – either having a gay friend or
family member or being knowledgeable about the fraternity system – served to increase
transportation. In general, the results showed that the presence of familiar issues or topics
increased transportation (Green, 2004).
Of particular interest to this study is that previous knowledge or similarity
produced higher transportation although homosexuality and fraternities were not
presented as entirely positive in the narrative. This is interesting in light of the current
study that proposes increased familiarity with mental illness will lead to low perceived
realism, and that in turn will lead to lower transportation. Both personal familiarity and
experience refer to an individuals’ real-life background of exposure and involvement
with other individuals who experience a mental illness.
Perceived realism and counter-arguing
Certainly, characters that represent some characteristics of oneself, or one’s
experience in the real world are easier to identify with (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2006). The
transportation-imagery model is based on the notion that individuals process narratives
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differently from other communications because they suspend disbelief and become
immersed in the story presented (Green & Brock, 2002). Indeed, narrative persuasion is
often not discounted, even when individuals knowingly read fiction. This may occur
because of the mix of truth and imagination that makes up many entertainment narratives.
Green and Brock (2002) state that, “Individuals seem to approach fiction with a
plausibility criterion in mind – if the information seems reasonable, it appears to have an
impact equal to information labeled as fact” (p.329).
Green (2004) found support for the hypothesis that perceived realism mediates the
relationship between transportation and attitude change, although she notes that the order
of transportation leading to perceived realism was not tested, and it could, in fact, have
occurred in a reverse order.
Likewise, Busselle and Bilandzic (2006) note that realism in narrative does not
necessarily relate to an actual comparison to the real world, but is concerned with the
plausibility and consistency of the story. Perceived realism of the narrative also enables
smooth processing. To make this distinction clear, Busselle and Bilandzic (2007)
differentiate between external realism, or the extent to which fictional content is
consistent with the actual world, and narrative realism, which deals with the logic and
consistency of motivations and events within the fictional narrative. They propose that
violations of coherence and explanation prompt negative evaluations of both types of
perceived realism in fictional narratives. When narratives lack adequate levels of these
two concepts, viewers perceive the narrative as less credible and less enjoyable (Busselle
& Bilandzic, 2007).
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Perceived realism has been put forth as a variable that encourages or increases
presence (Witmer & Singer, 1998, Balakrishnan et al., 2007) as well as a moderator of a
number of other variables including attitudes and behaviors (Potter, 1988). Realism can
be defined or operationalized as related to the content of the medium, as well as
something that is tied to the modality itself. For instance, the term “social realism” has
been used by Lombard and Ditton (1997), they posit:
“ . . . It is not storylines, characters, and acting that must be perceived as
realistic, but the behavior of the computer or other medium itself: when
the computer provides plausible responses to user inputs and does not act
erratically or break down (“crash”), it is more likely to be perceived not as
a medium but as a social entity.” (p.12)
Others have focused on perceived reality as a characteristic of the media user. Potter
(1998) gives the conceptual definition of perceived realism dealing with a “magic
window.” He states that the “Magic window is concerned with the degree to which a
viewer believes television content is an unaltered, accurate representation.” Researchers
have also examined what story elements influence perceived reality. Shapiro and Chock
(2003) found that typicality was strongly tied to perceived reality, meaning that the more
typical content was, the more real it seemed. Also of interest, Shapiro and Chock (2003)
postulate that individuals often lack the motivation or skills to thoughtfully make
decisions about the reality of content. They say that this is particularly true of stimuli
wherein the pace of the story is controlled, such as in television, the medium in which
most studies concerned with perceived realism have been conducted. Witmer and Singer
(1998) developed scale items that tap four dimensions of realism, one of which is termed
“scene realism.” This definition combines Potter’s (1988) content-oriented
conceptualization and Lombard and Ditton’s (1997) modality-centered conceptualization.
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Witmer and Singer (1998) claim that in virtual environments, presence should increase as
scene realism increases when scene realism is governed by “scene content, texture,
resolution, light sources, field of view (FOV), dimensionality, etc. (p. 230).”
Learning from fiction
Those studying the processing of narratives, drama and fiction from a
psychological perspective have been interested in the potential effects of content for
many years. Some work has been done on individual characteristics related to persuasion
by fiction, such as Busselle and Bilandzic’s (2007) findings on the tendency or proclivity
of individuals to let themselves feel transported. Slater and Rouner (2002) argue that
considering the motivations, purposes and goals of the message recipient is necessary to
assess the processing of different types of messages.
Perhaps one of the only studies to explicitly examine how television content could
affect viewer support for controversial political or policy positions is Slater, et al.’s
(2006) study looking at effects of viewing television shows dealing with the death
penalty and gay marriage. In the study, the authors suggest three possible mechanisms of
narrative persuasion. First, variables describing the degree of immersion may mediate
persuasive effects. The second mechanism may be via cognitive elaboration, so that
thoughts affirming or differing with the position or feeling of the protagonist may
increase or decrease persuasion. Thirdly, issues of priming of underlying values
associated with the topic at hand and the narrative may play a large role (Slater et al.,
2006).
Slater et al.’s (2006) study found changed or diminished beliefs for viewers who
watched the pro-death penalty message, but no attitude change was apparent after
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viewing the pro-gay marriage television content (Slater et al., 2006). Researchers
measured ideology as a continuous variable, and even though parts of the sample were
exposed to messages with which they most likely did not agree, very little counterarguing took place, leading the researchers to conclude that the narrative structure of the
content did indeed prevent counter-arguing or counterfactual thinking from taking place
(Slater et al., 2006).
Other experimental research has concluded that audiences compartmentalize, or
keep new information learned from fictional accounts separate from other, already
existing beliefs about the subject (Gerrig & Prentice, 1991). Still others have noted the
role of a prior story-bank, or a mental stockpile of thematically related stories (Mazzocco,
Green, & Brock, 2007). Mazzocco et al. (2007) tested numerous proposals about whether
a prior story-bank would reduce attention, increase attention or induce selective attention.
They found support that prior story-bank exposure facilitated processing of new narrative
stories. Marsh, Meade and Redoger (2003) drew upon Potts and Peterson’s (1985) work
that distinguishes text processing of literature as either integration or
compartmentalization. They found support for a hybrid of these processes. Participants
read stories that contained either real-world facts or misinformation. On a test of general
knowledge that incorporated ideas presented in the stories, those who had read stories
with correct facts scored better immediately following reading and at a second point in
time. However, contrary to some of the research documenting misattribution of sources,
subjects remained proficient in identifying what facts were present in the narratives and
which were not (Marsh et al., 2003).
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Recent research that utilized the ELM as a theoretical guide involved testing
attitude change based on transcripts of a speech. In a study using non-narrative speech as
the message given to participants, labeling the communication as fact instead of fiction
appeared to enhance critical processing, or scrutiny devoted to the test. Despite differing
levels of scrutiny, there were no differences found for the persuasiveness of the factlabeled or fiction labeled speech (Green, Garst, Brock & Chung, 2006). This finding may
further support Green and Brock’s (2002) position that enhanced critical processing of
narratives is not a true indicator of attitude change.
One study found that an individual's processing of texts differently was based
upon knowledge of the genre before reading it (Zwaan, 1994). Notably, individuals spent
more time reading a text that they believed to be fiction as compared to what they
believed to be a news article (Zwaan, 1994). This study certainly supports the notion that
individual differences and preconceptions about communications influence the way that
people perceive and process them.
Counter-arguing and processing (transportation)
Violations of perceived realism and contradictions of strongly held beliefs may be
some of the most important indicators of counter-arguing that occurs while experiencing
narratives. Since Green & Brock (2002) make a point of describing transportation as
something different than what is found in the dual-process models, many studies have
been designed to test differences and similarities and in these two processes.
Appel and Richter (2007) state that the very nature of transportation into
narratives reduces the likelihood of counter-arguing, and may lead to persistent
persuasive effects completely independent of critical elaboration – something the ELM
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would argue less likely, given that ideas that are critically elaborated upon and accepted
via the central route lead to longer-lasting persuasion. Their research showed a shift in
beliefs so that audiences’ belief certainty about real-world truths disputed in a narrative
account decreased over time (Appel & Richer, 2007).
Indeed, in Green & Brock’s (2000) study, participants’ responses to the need for
cognition scale were insignificant to transportation or persuasion via the message. A few
studies have used dual-processing models to explore whether statistical-based or
narrative-based messages have a more persuasive effect on viewers. Studies and metaanalyses often result in contradictory findings of what type of message is more persuasive
(see Allen & Preiss, 1997; Kopfman et al., 1998), but this may be due to inconsistent
definitions of what constitutes a narrative message and what does not in the health
communication realm.
Tal-Or et al. (2004) also looked at the role of counterfactual thinking by showing
videos that either explicitly stated a counter-factual (an opposing argument that may
reduce the influence of the message) or did not. Their experiments built on Green and
Brock’s work that supports the persuasiveness of narratives, as they found that all groups
who watched the narrative were persuaded, but the narrative that included a self-oriented
counterfactual was found to be more persuasive. Therefore it was proposed that
counterfactual thinking may serve as a mechanism of narrative persuasion only when it is
the trigger for a “particularly potent emotional punch” (p. 223). Research discussing
entertainment-education also demonstrates that immersion or absorption into a narrative
text may inhibit counter-arguing with the message.
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Attitude change over time
Unlike Appel and Richter (2007), Priester, Wegener, Pett, and Fabrigar (1999)
found that the sleeper effect, or a persuasive influence that increases, rather than
decreases over time, emerged only when the original message was initially elaborated
upon. The sleeper effect is generally tested with attitude measures at multiple points in
time. Participants are exposed to a message and then given a discounting cue about the
message, such as low source credibility (Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004). The sleeper
effect was originally thought of as a process by which individuals remember the message
clearly, this especially occurs when elaboration about the message occurs (Priester at al.,
1999) but failure to remember or associate the source of the message also occurs
(Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004). Appel and Richter’s study
supports the second part of this thesis. They found support for the source (in their case, a
clearly explained and fictional, narrative text) being forgotten over time, yet attitudes
remained strong over time after reading a narrative, which was not critically elaborated
upon similar to persuasive communications utilized in other studies of the sleeper effect.
Lee & Leets (2002) found that the effects of messages deemed high-narrative that
contained implicit messages about racism decayed over time, while the effects of
messages deemed low-narrative that contained explicit messages endured over time, and,
for some groups, increased slightly. This study demonstrates an interesting pattern in the
longevity of persuasion from narratives, although it was not a test of the sleeper effect per
se, as no discounting cues were given to participants after reading these biased and racist
stories.

29

Ditton (1997) studied the inability to recall the source of information, as well as
the recognition that the viewing of a message resulted in attitude change or beliefs. The
study involved participants viewing short clips of scenes of movies, and involved
multiple time measures of the effects of the film clips. Participants showed the effects of
watching the clips, each of which depicted a separate fictional account, both immediately
after viewing and two weeks later, although attitudes did not become stronger, indicating
a sleeper effect was not present. Ditton’s study tested a model of memory processing with
three distinct dimensions that explain mistakenly attributing fictional content to real
world experience. These dimensions include encoding issues, storage issues and retrieval
issues. Retrieval issues, dealing with identifying the source of previously learned
information seemed to be the faulty process; Individuals remembered fictional knowledge
as real world knowledge, regardless of their correctness (Ditton, 1997).
Misidentifying people and characters within a mediated situation is not an
uncommon phenomenon. Gibbons, Vogl, and Grimes (2003) found that participants
misidentified people in the news such that bystanders, victims, and alleged criminals
were identified as the criminals portrayed in newscasts.
Entertainment-Education
Although not all research in the domain of entertainment-education, or
edutainment, is focused on the cognitive processes or contributing variables, health
campaigns that employ the use of public narratives has been successful for many years.
Researchers of narratives and attitude change have credited Bandura’s social cognitive
theory (1977; 1986) as the theoretical groundings of entertainment education (Green,
2006; Slater & Rouner, 2002). Slater & Rouner (2002) claim that the role of social
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cognitive theory is undoubted, but more research and theory should be developed in
regard to more than modeling behaviors that are presented. Entertainment education,
Slater and Rouner (2002) argue, “Clearly has substantial effects on attitudes and
behavior.” This effect is most likely more complex than simple modeling behaviors.
Slater and Rouner (2002) look at the processing of entertainment education in
light of the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). They propose extending the ELM to use
identification with characters and engagement in the story line to predict successful
persuasion. They also maintain that central and peripheral processes are indiscernable in
a narrative contexts, due the increased role that absorption plays. The authors also
suggest that for entertainment-education to succeed in changing the attitudes and beliefs
of a target audience, the narrative structure of the message must stand on its own. That is,
the message that is trying to be conveyed can be apparent, but it must be less salient than
the story itself. Slater and Rouner (2002) take the position of others (Tal-Or et al., Slater,
Rouner & Long, 2006) that immersion or absoption into a narrative precludes counterarguing.
In 2003, the television show ER incorporated a storyline about gay men diagnosed
with syphilis, in cooperation with the Centers for Disease Control. This was done to
promote awareness about preventions and screening following syphilis outbreaks among
homosexual men in several large urban areas in the United States (Whittier, et al., 2005).
Responses to an online questionnaire showed that among gay men who had seen the ER
storyline, intention to get tested for syphilis and encourage others to do the same was
higher than those who had not. At the beginning of the entertainment-education
phenomenon was the incorporation of social initiatives in Mexican telenovelas (Berrueta,
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1986 in Singhal & Rogers, 1989; Slater & Rouner, 2002). Adult literacy rates and visits
to family planning clinics increased dramatically after favorite television shows depicted
the advantages of doing so.
Overseas, public health initiatives have spearheaded complete television series,
complete with short epilogues that reemphasize the program’s message, as seen in the
Indian Hum Log series (Singhal & Rogers, 1989). Slater and Rouner (2002) point to
messages promoted in American television based on both collaborations with government
or non-profit entities and television shows, as well as those based on the convictions of
writers and producers. Slater and Rouner’s (2002) examples of messages about racism
and bigotry, Roots and All in the Family, seem to blur the lines between entertainmenteducation and the potential for attitude change after exposure to specific media content.
Unintended or undesirable attitude change based on exposure to narratives has
been studied by other researchers. Some have tested stories created as recruitment tools
for white supremacist groups. Lee and Leets (2002) tested the effect of low-narrative vs.
high-narrative content with explicit vs. implicit attitudes being conveyed. Similar to
much of the research on narrative impact, researchers found that high-narrative, implicit
messages were more persuasive than low-narrative, explicit messages. Results also
showed that individuals predisposed to disagree with messages showed evidence of more
counter-arguing, and thus were processing the messages centrally, rather than
peripherally (Lee & Leets, 2002).
Despite the benefits that entertainment-education has had, the same processes of
applying learned attitudes from entertainment narratives to real-world beliefs can occur
with misinformation and stereotypes as well. Although cultivation theory’s focus is not
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on cognitive processing of media, researchers in that tradition have demonstrated a
pattern in attitudes that differ among heavy and light viewers of television – especially
among attitudes toward violence and crime (for review, see Gerbner, Gross, Morgan,
Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002; Shanahan & Morgan, 1999).
Mental illness in the media – effects and content
One study examined the stigma attached to mental illness by exposing
participants to a feature-length film about a woman’s struggle with schizophrenia. After
viewing the film, participants viewed a selected educational trailer told from either a
patient’s or doctor’s perspective (Ritterfield & Jin, 2006). This study took an
entertainment-education approach to test methods of combatting stigma about mental
illness via a movie, and concluded that less stigmatization and significant knowledge gain
only occurred when participants watched the movie and an educational trailer. Exposure
to the movie alone actually increased negative attitudes toward mental illness (Ritterfield
& Jin, 2006).
Interestingly, participants’ knowledge gain did not contribute to more positive
feelings toward the mentally ill. Before watching the movie, which contained a character
with schizophrenia not acting violent or dangerous in any way, 99% of the sample agreed
that “schizophrenia results in aggressive and often violent behavior,” while only 31%
agreed directly after the treatment, and 33% agreed at a follow-up time.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (1992) has found that Americans list the
media as their number one source for news and information about mental illness.
This may be problematic because content analyses of media portrayals of mental illness
have overwhelmingly found that the mentally ill are presented in a number of negative
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ways, most noticeably disproportionately violent (Coverdale, Nairn, & Claase, 2002;
Fruth & Padderud, 1985; Wahl & Roth, 1982). Between two and three percent of major
characters are depicted as mentally ill in America, (Diefenbach, 1997; Wahl & Roth,
1982) and about one-third of all prime-time entertainment programming deals with
mental illness in some form. Signorielli (1989) provided even more numbers on just how
dangerous the mentally ill appear to be. Almost one in 10 “normal” characters are killers,
and only 4.3% are killed, but slightly more than one in five mentally ill characters are
killers, and a similar percentage are killed themselves. The prevalence of the mentally ill
on television led Wahl and Roth (1982) to comment that crime and love are perhaps the
only topics that receive more attention than mental illness.
Gerbner (1998) labels television drama “the wholesale distributor of the stigma of
mental illness” (p.39). The mentally ill are the single most violent and victimized group
on television.
Negative portrayals of the mentally ill most often deal with the themes of
dangerousness and violence. Of all depictions of the mentally ill on television, around
two-thirds have been shown to commit an act of violence against someone (Rose, 1997;
Philo, 1996). While most characters on television are given some sort of social identity –
a job, a set of friends, a family life, the mentally ill are generally not given such a natural
placement in the world. Wahl and Roth (1982) found 75% of mentally ill characters had
no visible family connections, and 50% were presented as having no occupation.
In both news and dramatic prime-time programming, mentally ill characters were
even found to be filmed in a distinct way – alone and close-up – more so than “normal”
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characters were (Wahl & Roth, 1982). It can be argued that small differences like these
serve to further draw distinctions between “us” and “them.”
Some attempts have been made to measure the short-term, content-specific effects
of these negative depictions. There has been a slight, although significant increase in
perceptions of the mentally ill as dangerous from 1950 to 19961 (Phelan & Link, 1998).
This finding is surprising in light of decreases in of other prejudices (African-Americans,
homosexuals) over this same time period.
Few studies have attempted to gauge the media’s role in the perpetuation of these
stereotypes. Thornton and Wahl (1996) tested the effects of reading a newspaper article
in which a mental patient is sensationalistically portrayed as a murderer. They too found
participants in the experimental group had more negative opinions of the mentally ill than
the control group. However, the reading of a prophylactic article did result in
significantly more tolerant views of the mentally ill than reading only the inflammatory
newspaper article.
Hypotheses and Research Question
In light of the previous literature review, hypotheses and a research question
regarding the role of content, perceived realism of content, familiarity with mental
illness, transportation and presence are proposed.
Given the documented similarities in form and user variables that are associated
with increasing presence, the following is proposed:
H1: Levels of transportation will correlate with presence, so that those who
experience high transportation will also experience high feelings of presence.

35

The next set of hypotheses are proposed in an attempt to examine both the
moderating effect of personal familiarity on counter-arguing and perceived realism,
which in turn, mediate the level of presence and transportation predicted. Personal
familiarity is hypothesized to result in diminished perceived realism because of the gross
exaggeration of the mentally ill as violent found in the stimulus. Individuals who are
exposed to people with a mental illness in real life most likely have a more realistic view
of the mentally ill as relatively non-violent. This study posits that perceived realism
encourages transportation, which leads to story-consistent attitude change, as opposed to
the Green (2004) study that found no support for perceived realism as mediating the
relationship between transportation and belief change. Counter-arguing is a hypothesized
effect of low perceived realism.
H2A: Those who have high levels of personal, real-world familiarity or
experience with mental illness will show more evidence of counter-arguing than
those who do not.
H2B: Those who show low or non-existent levels of personal, real-world
familiarity or experience with mental illness will show no or very little evidence
of counter-arguing.
H3A: Those who show more evidence of counter-arguing will experience
less perceived social realism.
H3B: Those who show no evidence of counter-arguing will experience
more perceived social realism than those who do counter-argue.
H4A: Those who show less perceived realism will experience less
transportation and presence than those who experience higher perceived realism.
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H4B: Those who show more perceived realism will experience more
transportation and presence than those who experience lower perceived realism.
At the core of this research is understanding how the experience of watching
television crime dramas affects attitude change. Watching crime dramas may affect a
variety of real-world attitudes, but here, the focus is on how perceptions of the mentally
ill as violent are changed by exposure. The transportation literature predicts that to the
degree that individuals may become immersed or transported into a story, they will
emerge from the experience with changed beliefs about the real world.
H5: Those who watch the experimental stimulus will adapt storyconsistent attitudes about sufferers of mental illness.
H6: Increased feelings of transportation will lead to increased storyconsistent attitude change.
H7: Increased feelings of presence will lead to increased story-consistent
attitude change.
Understanding the relationship of presence, transportation and attitude change
over time is still in the beginning stages of study. Mixed results have been found for
attitude change over time and the “sleeper-effect.” This study is not a true test of the
sleeper effect, since a discounting cue is not given after exposure to the message.
However, just as the sleeper effect is concerned with memory of a reliable source of
information (Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004), the current study is interested in how people
may learn from fictional content, a seemingly unreliable source for some information. So:
RQ1: Will attitude change based on story-consistent beliefs hold,
diminish, or increase over time?
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CHAPTER III
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGY

Design and Procedure
This between-subjects experiment consisted of two cells, the first being the
experimental condition and the second being the control condition. Two different times
of attitude measures were included in the study design. All subjects individually viewed a
complete hour-long crime drama, without commercials or interruptions. Half of the
participants viewed the experimental stimulus (N=35), which portrays a schizophrenic
man as a murderer and the other half viewed the control stimulus (N=34).
After viewing one episode, participants responded to a questionnaire that
measured transportation, three dimensions of presence – spatial, engagement (mental
immersion), and social realism – personal familiarity with the mentally ill, and attitudes
toward mental illness and violence in general. All scales used a 7-point likert –type scale,
with anchors clearly marked. Two to three weeks after viewing, participants returned to
respond to the same attitude measures on the mentally ill. The first questionnaire took
participants approximately 10-15 minutes to complete, and the second questionnaire took
participants about 5 minutes to complete. Individual administration was used, as is the
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case with most research measuring presence. As such, distraction from other participants
was not an issue.
Participants
Undergraduate students enrolled in a research communication courses were
recruited for this study. All students were awarded extra credit or class credit for their
participation. Participants signed an informed consent form prior to the beginning of the
experiment, and were notified of their rights as participants in academic research at
Cleveland State University. The sample was 58% female (N=40) and 42% male (N=29).
The majority of respondents identified as Caucasian/white, (71%), 17.4% were African
American/black, and 12.6% were other nationalities. The age of participants ranged from
18 to 39 (M = 22.5, SD = 4.32, Mdn= 21).
Stimuli
The experimental condition of interest was an episode of Law & Order SVU,
titled “Blinded.” It features a serial rapist whose crimes are blamed on his schizophrenia.
Detectives, the prosecuting attorney, and the police department’s psychologist all discuss
how the disease influenced the crimes committed. Nothing explicitly untrue about
schizophrenia is stated, although the character with schizophrenia is portrayed as a
violent rapist and murderer, whose illness compels him to rape and murder young
women. This episode was chosen because the criminal’s psychiatric diagnosis is made
clear on several occasions, and there is little sympathy exhibited for him. The episode’s
portrayal of a man with schizophrenia as a violent criminal is consistent with content
analyses that document the tendency for television shows to portray the mentally ill in
negative, dangerous, and violent ways.
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The control stimulus was another episode of Law & Order SVU, titled “Snitch.”
The content in no way broaches the topic of mental illness, or abstractly related concepts
such as addiction issues or the developmentally disabled. It too features a female murder
victim. It is clear that mental illness is not the motivation for the crime. Both episodes
were viewed in their entirety (42 - 44 minutes), and had a TV-14 rating. These narratives
are shown in their entirety to give a sense of continuity and to give participants enough
time to become immersed in the narrative as Busselle and Bilandzic (2006) suggest.
Independent variables
One independent variable in this study was the content viewed – either an
episode with a violent and dangerous mentally ill criminal, or an episode with a violent
and dangerous criminal who exhibits no signs of mental illness. Familiarity or experience
with mental illness was also an independent variable, with proposed effects on variables
critical to transportation, presence and attitude change.
Manipulation check
A manipulation check was also included in the questionnaire to ensure that the
stimuli were perceived in the way it was intended to be comprehended. All participants
recorded their agreement with two statements, which were: “The episode I just watched
dealt with the issue of mental illness” and “The character portrayed as committing
murder in this episode displayed signs of mental illness.” The anchors on the 1-7 point
scale used in these items were anchored with “Strongly disagree” and "Strongly agree.”
This check is necessary in order to establish the necessary conditions for a number of
hypotheses, most notably H5. Significant differences were found between the conditions
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on their responses to these two items, such that those in the experimental condition agree
with these statements more than those in the control condition.
An Independent Samples t-test revealed that the participants in the experimental
condition agreed with the first manipulation check item, which asked about the issue of
mental illness being present in the episode, (M= 6.22) more so than the control group (M
= 2.32, SD = .25), as predicted t (df) = 67, p<.001, η2 = .625). This same pattern of
intended results was found with the second manipulation check item as well, which asked
about the mental illness of the character committing murder in the episode, where the
experimental group (M=6.00) differed from the control group (M=3.02; t (df) = 67,
p<.001, η2 = .658).
Table 1
Manipulation check means
Variable
1. Manip. check – Exp.
(Issue of mental illness)
1. Manip. check – Control
(Issue of mental illness)
2. Manip. check – Exp.
(Character with m.i.)
2. Manip. check – control
(Character with m.i.)

Mean

SD

6.22**

1.238

2.32**

1.787

6.00**

1.847

3.02**

1.882

Note. (df) = 67, **p<.001, η2 = .658, N = 69

Dependent variables
The proposed model posits that more familiarity (with mental illness) leads to less
perceived realism. Increased counter-arguing is predicted to cause less transportation and
feelings of presence. At the same step, increased perceived realism is posited to cause
more transportation and feelings of presence. Transportation and presence serve both as
variables with mediators (i.e. counter-arguing, perceived realism) and as a moderating
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variable of attitude change. It is proposed that higher transportation and presence will
lead to higher agreement with story-consistent attitudes; such that the mentally ill are
dangerous, violent and undesirable to be around. So, greater transportation and presence
will lead to greater story-consistent attitudes about the mentally ill. Attitudes toward the
mentally ill and the prevalence of violence are the last step, and therefore are true
dependent variables.
Measures
Recall.
In addition to measures of all the variables of interest, participants were
administered a 10-item memory recall at the beginning of the questionnaire. This was
done to ensure that participants paid attention to the content and comprehended what it
meant. This style of memory testing was developed by Shapiro (1996). Due to the
confusing nature of one recall measure in each condition, 9 items were used to gauge
participants’ recall of each stimulus. Only one participant’s data was not used as a result
of failing to answer at least 6 of the 9 recall items correctly, resulting in a total N of 69.
Transportation.
The transportation-imagery model scale (Green & Brock, 2000) was used to
measure transportation. Wording of items was modified from those about a narrative text
to better ask about the narrative video stimuli. Instead of questions 12-17 asking about
the “vivid imagery” of specific characters, one item was created, “I had vivid imagery of
the characters while watching this show,” to create 12 items total. Examples of
transportation items include, “I found my mind wandering while watching the television
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program,” (reverse-coded) and “I could picture myself in some of the scenes depicted on
screen.” The transportation scale reached a Cronbach’s Alpha of .819.
In this study, Green and Brock’s (2000) transportation scale did not factor quite as
cleanly as it did in the original study. A confirmatory Factor Analysis revealed a twofactor solution. Table B1 in Appendix B displays results of this analysis. The third factor
specified by Green and Brock is the Imagery factor, here, item 12. As noted previously,
this study condensed the four-item measure into one item, simply testing the overall
perceived imagery of all the characters.
Two of the three cognitive items (per Green & Brock, 2000) factored together
along with: item 2, “While I was watching the episode, activity going on in the room
around me was on my mind,” (reverse-coded), item 6, “I wanted to learn how the show
ended,” and item 9, “I found my mind wandering while watching the television program.
The third cognitive item had near equal loadings on both factors, making the item an
insignificant contribution to either factor according the levels set Hair et al. (2006).
The second factor includes two of the three designated affective items (7 and 11).
The other items that loaded on the second factor were: 8, “I found myself thinking of
ways the show could have turned out differently;” 10, “The events in the narrative are
relevant to my everyday life;” 11, “The events in the narrative changed my life;” and item
12, which measured perceived vivid imagery. Item 5 was another cross-loading item, and
as such could not be designated to one factor over another significantly. Despite the
cross-loading of two items, they were retained in the measure for future analyses for three
major reasons. First, the scale as a whole attained good reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha =
.819). Secondly, the decision to retain items was based on keeping the scale as close to
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the original, with the exception for making wording changes to reflect a video narrative,
in order to hypothesize about the relationship between transportation and other theoretical
concepts. Lastly, the total variance explained was 49%, an encouraging finding.
With the exception of item 8 loading on Factor 2 instead of Factor 1, and the two
cross-loading items, Factor 1 basically represented cognitive items, while Factor 2
represented affective items. Factor 1 contained items 2, 4, 6, and 9, all of which seem to
be encapsulating how much attention or cognitive effort a viewer is using while engaging
in the story. An interesting part of Factor 2 was its inclusion of items 10 and 11, which
really get at one being a changed person as a result of viewing the narrative. On face
value, it would make sense that these items would be grouped together with affective or
emotional items, such that the more a narrative left a person with a positive affect, it
would also leave them more changed.
Presence.
The measures used to gauge the spatial presence, mental engagement
(immersion), and the social realism dimensions of presence come from the Temple
Presence Inventory, published by Lombard and Ditton (2000). Most of the presence items
are measures on the same 7-point scale transportation is measured on, although some
measures of spatial presence are measured on 7-point semantic differential with differing
anchors.
Examples of spatial presence items include, “How often did you want to try to
touch something you saw/heard?” measured on a “Never” to “Always” scale, and “How
much did it seem as if the objects and people you saw/heard had come to the place you
were,” measured on a “Not at all” to “Very much” 7 point scale. The spatial presence
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dimension contained eight items, all of which were revealed to represent one factor in a
confirmatory factor analysis. Factor analysis results are displayed in Table B3 in
Appendix B. All items had a factor loading of over .400, the lowest of which was for the
item, Window, at .488. The total variance explained by the items was 53.83%. The
Cronbach’s Alpha of this item was .809.
Engagement, or mental immersion, is the second presence dimension of interest.
Examples of these items include, “How involving was the media experience,” and “To
what extent did you feel mentally immersed in the experience?” The Cronbach’s Alpha
of this 5-item scale was .801. Factor analysis findings are shown in Table B4 in
Appendix A. The engagement dimension of presence also produced a one-factor solution,
explaining 51.656% of the variance. Like spatial presence, all items had a factor loading
of over .400.
The third dimension of interest is social realism. This scale divides realism into
two different types, just as Lombard and Ditton (1997) make the distinction between the
two concepts. Social realism is concerned with whether or not occurrences in the text
could (or would) happen in real life. Examples of social realism items include, “The
events I saw/heard would occur in the real world,” and “The events I saw/heard could
occur in the real world.” This study will use all three items from the social realism scale.
The Cronbach’s Alpha for this measure was .819.
The social realism dimension of presence was also factor analyzed; results are in
Table B5 in Appendix B. This three-item scale explained 75.270% of the total variance
with a one-factor solution. All of the factor loadings were above a .800, indicating a great
fit. This scale attained a Cronbach’s Alpha of .831.
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Personal familiarity.
Familiarity or experience with a group of people is a somewhat broad construct,
but in this study these measures were used to gauge to what degree participants were
involved with a person or people who suffer from a mental illness in their real life. In
Green’s (2004) study on the role of personal familiarity with the fraternity system and/or
homosexuals, there were not enough participants who reported personally being gay or in
a fraternity or sorority, and so other, more generalized measures were employed.
Familiarity was thus operationalized as those who had close friends or family members
who were homosexual or those who reported higher knowledge about the Greek system
in universities. It may be unlikely that a sizeable number of participants have been
diagnosed with a mental illness, and willingness to disclose a diagnosis may be limited.
As a result, the study measured personal familiarity or experience with mental illness as
exposure and closeness to other individuals who suffer a mental illness.
There are three measures of familiarity or personal experience with mental illness,
all of which are measured on a 1-7 point likert scale, with 1 meaning, “Strongly
disagree,” and 7 meaning, “Strongly agree.” These measures are, “I am in regular contact
with someone who suffers from either a minor or severe mental illness,” “My job
requires that I work with or around people diagnosed with mental illness,” and “A person,
or people who are close to me have dealt with a mental illness.” After scaling these items
together, the second mental illness familiarity item about working with those who suffer a
mental illness was dropped in order to improve scale reliability. The second measure also
had a much lower mean than the other two items. The reliability coefficient of this scale
met Hair et al.’s (2006) cutoff of .70 for a Cronbach’s Alpha, or .60 for exploratory
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research. The Cronbach’s Alpha reported was .799. All scale reliabilities can be found in
Appendix B.
Measures of personal familiarity with victimization of a violent crime are
included as well. Measured on the same 7-point scale, an example of these measures is,
“Violent crime has touched someone close to me.” These measures were not used for
analysis.
Counter-arguing.
This measure included one open-ended question, “Please spend a few minutes
writing down the thoughts that crossed your mind and how you were feeling when you
were watching the video. Don’t worry about spelling, grammar, or punctuation.”
Responses to this open-ended question were counted and recorded for each participant.
Counter-arguing included a range of comments, all of which expressed some dimension
of unbelievability. Examples include disbelief in a character’s mental condition, bad
acting, or general disbelief in the storyline. There were 11 cases of counter-arguing
across both cells, and 7 of those occurred with participants who viewed the experimental
condition.
Perceived realism.
In addition to the presence measures that cover social realism, additional
measures of the perceived realism of the narrative were utilized. Green (2004) modified
Elliott, Rudd and Good’s (1994) scale of perceived realism to better measure perceived
realism of narratives. The 8-item scale has also been employed in the use of studying
video narratives as well (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2006). These eight items are also
measured on 1-7 point scale, with 1 meaning, “Strongly disagree,” and 7 meaning,
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“Strongly agree.” Examples of items include, “People in this narrative are like people you
or I might actually know,” and “Events that have actually happened or could happen are
discussed in this narrative.”
Despite attaining an acceptable reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s Alpha = .757),
Green’s (2004) perceived realism scale did not result in a clean Factor Analysis. Green
(2004) does not provide information as to how the items are supposed to factor. Results
are found in Table B2 in Appendix B. Three of the eight items had loadings of above
.400 on more than one factor, a problem according to Hair et al. (2006). All three crossloading items had sizeable loadings on Factor 3, with two of them also having sizeable
loadings on the first factor and the remaining item loading on both Factors 2 and 3. This
may be due the difficulty concerning summarizing the components of the third factor.
Judging by the items that contribute to Factor 3, this factor may be the dimension
that expresses the most concern about whether these things happen in the real world.
Factor 2 seems to be the most content specific; that is, some realistic content could not
show difficult decisions being made or people with good and bad sides, as items Choices
and GoodBad infer. The first Factor seems to contain the most straightforward items
about the realism of the characters, dialogue and settings in the narrative. Overall,
65.571% of the total variance was explained.
Attitudes toward the mentally ill.
There were 20 attitude measures included in the questionnaire. Ten of these items
measure attitudes about violence. Attitudes about violence in general were included to
ease the transition into answering questions about mental illness. Responses to these
items are not expected to differ, as there is a violent crime moving the plot along in both
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the experimental and control stimuli. Among the violence questions are the Mean World
Index (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan & Signorielli, 1980). Examples of these items include “I
often take measures to ensure my own safety,” and “In dealing with others, you can’t be
too careful.”
Another 10 items gauge attitudes toward mental illness, some of which are
modified items from the Community Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill scale (CAMI)
developed by Taylor and Dear (1983). Of Taylor and Dear’s (1983) five dimensions,
items from benevolence and social restrictiveness were modified for the current research.
These attitude measures were developed to gauge community members’ attitudes toward
the mentally ill. Participants were given the following definition of mental illness, which
they were instructed to keep in mind when answering the attitude measures:
“Any of various psychiatric disorders or diseases, usually characterized by
impairment of thought, mood, or behavior, including diseases of the mind and personality
and certain diseases of the brain. Please keep in mind that mental illness may be severe to
moderate in nature. For the purpose of this study, please do not consider those with
addiction issues or developmental disorders that limit one’s intellectual ability as the
mentally ill.”
Examples of these measures include, “The mentally ill commit far more crimes
than those who do not suffer a mental illness,” and “It is best to avoid anyone who has
mental problems.” Other items were developed just for this study. Examples of these
measures include: “Those who have been diagnosed with a mental illness should be
forced, through whatever means necessary, to undergo treatment and medication
prescribed by their doctor,” and “I would feel comfortable with my children having
contact with a person with a mental illness.” Two items were dropped from analysis due
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to concerns about their wording, and to increase the reliability of the scale. This 8-item
measure achieved a Cronbach’s Alpha of .746.
A factor analysis of this scale was also completed. A two-factor solution was created,
with the first factor explaining 32.79% of the variance, and the second factor explaining
19.17% percent of the variance. Examining the items that make up each factor, it seems
that Factor 1 encompasses items that have to do with the mentally ill being seen as
socially undesirable, while Factor 2 contains items that express the ideas that the mentally
ill are violent, and that their rights should be suppressed for the greater good. The full
results of this analysis are in Table 6 in the Results section.
Pilot test
A pilot test was completed several months prior to the start of data collection.
The pilot test looked at transportation and story-consistent attitudes after viewing one of
two Law & Order SVU episodes featuring a mental illness storyline. It did not look at
perceived realism or presence and employed group administration. Findings from the
pilot test influenced the current design and construction of measures in many ways. First,
due to a lack of significant main effects of attitude change based on the experimental
condition, different stimuli were chosen for the current study. The new episode features a
schizophrenic murderer, who receives less sympathy than the bipolar female character
used in the first experimental stimulus. The crime is also depicted as more intentional
than the crimes in the previous episode.
One of the only significant findings was that those who reported high levels of
victimization reported significantly lower levels of transportation than those who in the
medium-victimized or low-victimized groups. It is theorized that low perceived realism
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of the episode served to diminish transportation and attitude change among this group,
and so the addition of perceived realism was added to the current research.

51

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1.
A Pearson’s r zero-order correlation was used to test the first hypothesis, that
comparing levels of transportation will correlate with presence, so that those who
experience high transportation will also experience high feelings of presence.
Transportation was measured with Green and Brock’s (2000) transportation-imagery
scale. Three dimensions of presence were measured with the Temple Presence Inventory
scales: spatial presence, engagement (mental immersion) and social realism (Lombard &
Ditton, 2000).
The relationships between transportation and each of the three presence
dimensions were all significantly, and highly, correlated. Transportation and spatial
presence shared an r =.447, transportation and engagement had a r =.599, and
transportation and the social realism dimension of presence had a r =.410 (p<.001, r (df)
= 67). The engagement dimension of presence also shared significant correlations with
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the other two dimensions of presence. Hypothesis 1 was supported. Results are displayed
in Table 2

Table 2
Pearson Correlation Between Transportation and Three Dimensions of Presence
1. Transport
2. Spatial
3. Engagement 5. Soc. Realism
1. Transportation

.447**

.599**

.410**

--

.817**

.209

--

.306*

-2. Spatial Presence
3. Engagement
4. Social Realism

--

Note. **p<.001, *p<.01. N = 69 for each correlation.

Hypotheses 2-4.
Hypotheses 2 through 4 posited a time-order relationship predicting that first
personal familiarity, then counter-arguing, and lastly perceived realism, will affect
transportation and presence among participants. These analyses included only those
participants who viewed the experimental condition, because these predicted outcomes
are inherently tied to familiairity and attitudes toward the metnally ill.
Utilizing Structural Equation Modeling was the first proposed analysis. However,
due to the small N of those who counter-argued, a series of regressions were used in its
place. Only 7 cases of counter-arguing were present in the experimental condition, which
makes finding a significant path with that variable highly unlikely. Since a larger number
of participants were expected to counter-argue, and statistical analysis in utilizing a
variable with only 7 instances poses many threats, this analysis was dropped. A
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discussion about the frequency and role of counter-arguing in narrative follows in the
next section. Because this variable was dropped, hypothesis 2, which predicted that
increased familiarity and personal experience with the mentally ill will lead to increased
counter-arguing, and hypothesis 3, which postulated that those who show more evidence
of counter-arguing will experience less perceived realism, can not be supported.
After removing counter-arguing from the equation, Linear Multiple Regressions
were run in which the first block entered was personal familiarity with mental illness.
These measures asked participants if they are close to, or spend much time with a person
or people who suffer a mental illness. Familiarity was treated as a precursor to perceived
realism, and as such, responses to Green’s (2004) perceived realism in narrative scale
were entered in the second block.
Three regressions were run, the first with transportation as the predicted variable,
one with spatial presence as the predicted variable and the last with engagement (mental
immersion) presence as the predicted variable. The third dimension of presence explored
in this study, perceived social realism, was left out of analysis due to its confounding
nature with the other perceived realism measure. It was proposed that increased personal
familiarity with the mentally ill will lead to decreased perceived realism because
television narratives’ portrayal of the mentally ill are more violent and dangerous than the
mentally ill are in individuals’ real-world interactions with them. Therefore, those who
spend a good deal of time with the mentally ill and are comfortable with the (most likely)
non-violent mentally ill people in their lives would be more likely to perceive the
portrayal of a man driven to rape and murder by his schizophrenia as unrealistic.
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A regression analysis revealed that the model significantly predicted
transportation, F(1, 66) = 15.518, p<.001. R2 for the model was .320, and adjusted R2 was
.299. Table 3 displays unstandardized regression coefficients, (B), intercept, and
standardized regression coefficients (β) for each variable. Step 1 approached significance
in the opposite direction than predicted; increased familiarity or personal experience with
those with mental illness may be tied to an increase in transportation felt. The significant
finding of this regression supports hypotheses 4A and B, such that the extent to which
one perceived the content as more real, they also experienced a greater sensation of
transportation. Perceived realism accounted for 32.0% of the variance explained in the
model, and enjoyed a Beta weight of .524. It is important to note that perceived realism
and transportation, both devised by the same author, share correlation of r = .547, p<.001.

Table 3
Multiple Regression Analysis for personal familiarity with mental illness and perceived
realism on transportation (N = 69)
Adj. R2
Variable
β
R2
B
SE B
Step 1
Familiarity

.106

.055

.229+

.052

.038

.515

.101

.524**

.320

.029

Step 2
Perceived
realism
Note. R2 Change = .268F(1, 66) = 15.518, p< .001 for Step 2 **p<.001, +p=.059.

A separate multiple regression analysis run for spatial presence obtained different
results, although perceived realism was still a significant predictor and familiarity was
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not. Multiple regression analysis revealed that the second step of the model significantly
predicted spatial presence, F(1, 66) = 2.593, p<.01. R2 for the model was .073, and
adjusted R2 was .045. Table 4 displays results. Here, personal familiarity with mental
illness does not approach significance as a predictor of spatial presence, as it did with
transportation. Perceived realism is a significant predictor of spatial presence, although it
only explains 7.3% of the variance. Perceived realism measured with Green’s (2004)
scale also correlates with spatial presence, r = .254, p<.05.

Table 4
Multiple Regression Analysis for personal familiarity with mental illness and perceived
realism on spatial presence (N = 69)
Variable
β
R2
Adj. R2
B
SE B
Step 1
Familiarity

-.051

.121

-.052

.003

-.012

.565

.253

.268*

.073

.045

Step 2
Perceived
realism
Note. R2 Change = .070, F(1, 66) = 2.593, p< .01 for Step 2, p = .674 for Step 1.

The last multiple regression analyzed in an attempt to test hypothesis 4 tested the
effect of familiarity with mental illness followed by perceived realism on engagement, or
mental immersion, a dimension of Lombard & Ditton’s (2000) Temple Presence
Inventory. Regression analysis revealed that the second step of the model significantly
predicted transportation, F(1, 66) = 5.929, p<.01. R2 for the model was .152, and adjusted
R2 was .127. Results are displayed in Table 5. Once again, familiarity was not a
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significant predictor. Perceived realism was found to explain 15.2% of the variance in
engagement; so higher perceived realism led to higher engagement in the narrative.
Overall, perceived realism was found to be a significant predictor of
transportation, spatial presence and engagement (mental immersion), supporting the
fourth hypothesis, which states that increased perceived realism will lead to increased
transportation and presence. As Tables 3 – 5 demonstrate, perceived realism predicted
transportation the best, with a β = .524, then engagement, β = .394, and then spatial
presence, β = .268. Personal familiarity, a part of hypothesis 3, was not found to be a
predictor of these variables.

Table 5
Multiple Regression Analysis for personal familiarity with mental illness and perceived
realism on engagement (mental immersion) dimension of presence (N =69)
Adj. R2
Variable
β
R2
B
SE
Step 1
Familiarity

-.035

.137

-.031

.001

-.014

.942

.274

.394

.152

.127

Step 2
Perceived
realism
Note. R2 Change = .151, F(1, 66) = 5.929, p< .01 for Step 2, p = .801 for Step 1.

Hypothesis 5.
In order to test hypothesis 5, that those who watch the experimental stimulus will
adapt story-consistent attitudes about people with a mental illness, an Independent
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Samples t-test was utilized. Attitudes toward the mentally ill were gauged with an 8-item
scale that addressed how dangerous and socially undesirable individuals perceived the
mentally ill to be. First, a factor analysis was completed on this newly created set of
items, which reached a Cronbach’s Alpha of .746.
An exploratory factor analysis of the eight variables that created the mental illness
attitudes scale – burden, nxtdoor, childmi(R), forced, deny (R), threat, tolerant(R), and
farmore – revealed a two-factor solution. A list of all scale items and means can be found
in Appendix B. Results of this factor analysis are displayed in Table 6 It appears that
Factor 1 describes attitudes about the social undesirability of the mentally ill. Items such
as Nxtdoor, “I would not want to live next door to someone who suffers a mental illness,”
and Burden, “The mentally ill are a burden on society,” express a distinct disdain for the
mentally ill, but are not expressly tied to a want to punish the mentally ill for perceived
violent characteristics. The two variables with the highest loadings on Factor 2 do just
that. The item Forced, “Those who have been diagnosed with a mental illness should be
forced, through whatever means necessary, to undergo treatment and medication
prescribed by their doctor,” and Deny, (reverse-coded), “The mentally ill should not be
denied their individual rights,” express a more restrictive attitude toward the mentally ill.
It appears that the attitudes toward the mentally ill scale taps two dimensions of
unfavorable views about people who have a mental illness.
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Table 6
Factor Analysis Results for the Mental Illness Attitudes Scale
Factor 1
Factor 2

Communalities

Tolernt (R)

.460

.412

.382

Childmi (R)

.716

.290

.597

Burden

.802

-.128

.660

Nxtdoor

.786

.181

.651

Threat

.691

.280

.555

Forced

-.105

.844

.724

Farmore

.306

.366

.227

Deny (R)

.233

.553

.360

Eigen Value

2.623

1.534

Percent of Total Variance

32.786%

19.171%

51.957%

Percent of Common Variance

63.1%

36.9%

100%

Note. KMO = .731, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, Approx. Chi Square = 119.895.

Hypothesis 5 was the basic prediction that despite differences in realism
judgments, personal familiarity/experience with mental illness, and varying levels of
transportation and presence, those who viewed the experimental condition would adapt
story-consistent beliefs, therefore expressing more negative attitudes toward the mentally
ill. No significance was found between the experimental group (M=3.75, SD=1.07) and
the control group: M=3.4869, SD=.95, t(1.111), p=.416. Mental illness attitude scale
items were all analyzed via separate Independent Sample t-tests, and there were no
significant differences on any of the eight items. Means of individual items and
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significance levels are displayed in Appendix C. Results can be found in Table 7
Hypothesis 5 was not supported.

Table 7
T-test results for the effect of experimental vs. control condition on attitudes toward the
mentally ill
Condition
eta2
M
SD
N
t
p
Experimental

3.76

1.069

35

Control

3.49

.9457

34

1.11

.271

.018

.271

Note. **p<.001, *p<.01.

Hypothesis 6.
A one-way ANOVA was used to analyze hypothesis 6, which states that increased
feelings of transportation will lead to increased story-consistent attitude change. Analyses
were conducted on data from participants that had seen the experimental episode. A
median split was used to divide participants into either a highly transported group (N =
17) or a lowly transported group (N = 13), as Green and Brock (2000) also did when
analyzing attitude change.
There were no significant differences in attitudes toward the mentally ill based on
the participants being highly or lowly transported while viewing the stimuli that depicted
a violent, dangerous mentally ill criminal. Means were nearly identical across the highly
transported (M = 3.7404, SD = 1.29) and the lowly transported (M = 3.88, SD = .832, F
(1, 28) = .134, p=.717, η2 = .005). Table 8 displays these results. Hypothesis 6 was not
supported.
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Table 8
ANOVA of high vs. low transportation’s effect on attitudes toward the mentally ill
M
SD
SS
df
MS
F
p
eta2
Low Transportation

3.74

1.29

High Transportation

3.88

.832

31.271

29

1.112

.134.

.717

.005

Note. **p<.001, *p<.01.

Hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 7, that those who feel a greater sense of presence will adapt more
story-consistent attitude beliefs was also tested via one-way ANOVA tests. Because
hypotheses 6 and 7 predicted that transportation and presence would have the same effect
on attitudes, a median split on three dimensions of presence was utilized. Here, those who
felt a greater sense of spatial presence (N = 11) were compared to those who experienced
a lower sense of spatial presence (N = 17). It is important to note that overall means for
the spatial presence scale were low across conditions, with a M = 2.548 overall. A
significant difference between higher (M = 3.98, SD = 1.03) and lower spatial presence
(M = 3.90, SD = 1.15, F(1, 28) = .040, p=.843, η2 = .005) felt on story-consistent attitude
change was not found. These results are in Table 9.
Table 9
ANOVA of high vs. low spatial presence’s effect on attitudes toward the mentally ill
M
SD
SS
df
MS
F
p
eta2
Low Transportation

3.90

1.03

High Transportation

3.98

1.06

30.703

Note. **p<.001, *p<.01.
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27

1.179

.040

.843

.005

The same analysis was used to test the role that the engagement (mental
immersion) dimension of presence would have on story-consistent attitudes towards the
mentally ill. There were non-significant findings for this dimension of presence as well,
with those who were highly engaged (M = 3.65, SD = .92, N = 17) not significantly
differing from their lesser-engaged counterparts (M = 3.83, SD = 1.16, N = 16, F(1, 28) =
.248, p=.622, η2 = .008). Table 10 shows these results.
The last dimension of presence tested was social realism. Responses to the social
realism scale were first categorized as high or low, as a median split was used for all of
this set of analyses. Table 11 displays these results. Once again those who experienced a
greater sense of social realism presence (M = 3.66, SD = 1.19, N = 12) did not agree with
story-consistent beliefs about the mentally ill more so than those who experienced a
lesser amount of social realism presence (M = 3.81, SD = 1.19, N = 20, F (1, 28) = .122, p
= .730, η2 = .004).
Overall, hypothesis 7 was not supported. Not one of the three dimensions of
presence tested had a significant, or an approaching significant, effect on story-consistent
attitudes, measured with a scale of items about attitudes toward the mentally ill.
Table 10
ANOVA of high vs. low engagement’s effect on attitudes toward the mentally ill
M
SD
SS
df
MS
F
p

eta2

Low Transportation

3.83

1.16

.008

High Transportation

3.65

.920

34.279

Note. **p<.001, *p<.01.
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32

1.09

.248

.622

Table 11
ANOVA of high vs. low social realism (presence)’s effect on attitudes toward the mentally
ill
M
SD
SS
df
MS
F
p
eta2
Low Transportation

3.81

1.19

High Transportation

3.66

1.08

38.335

31

1.273

.122

.730

.004

Note. **p<.001, *p<.01.

Research Question 1.
Research Question 1 asks whether story-consistent beliefs will hold, diminish or
increase over time, and as such, will be tested via a repeated measures t-test. Participants
responded to the same set of attitude items about the mentally ill a second time, between
2 and 3 weeks after first viewing the episode and filling out the original questionnaire.
The repeated measures t-test yielded significant results (p<.01) for differences in
responses to the attitudes toward mental illness scale, such that for those in the
experimental condition, the first measures of attitudes (M = 3.78, SD = 1.03, N = 22)
were higher, or more negative, than the second measure of attitudes (M = 3.29, SD =
.972, N = 22). In response to the research question, story-consistent attitudes diminished
over time. However, it is important to note that a main effect from the presence of the
storyline was not found.
It is interesting to note that means in the control condition did not differ
significantly between times of measure; M = 3.38, SD = .941, N = 20 at the first attitude
measure, and M = 3.28, SD = .944, N = 20, p=.632. Table 12. displays these results.
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Table 12
T-test results for difference in attitudes toward the mentally ill across time measures.
M
SD
N
t
p
Time 1

3.78*

1.03

22

Time2

3.29*

.972

22

2.862

.009

Note. **p<.001, *p<.050.

Additional Analyses
Multiple auxiliary analyses were performed in order to further understand the
complex relationships between perceived realism, counter-arguing, transportation and
presence. Since there were multiple hypotheses related to these concepts that were not
supported, or could not fully be tested, additional analysis was needed to parse out the
role of perceived realism and counter-arguing. Contrary to Green’s (2004) postulate that
transportation precedes perceived realism, this study found that perceived realism is also
a significant predictor of transportation and presence. This study wanted to explore these
constructs in Green’s (2004) proposed order as well. These first three additional analyses
attempt to explore that relationship, as well as perceived realism and two dimensions of
presence.
Gender and age analyses were added in order to rule out other third variables that
may explain some of the variance in other hypothesis testing. Lastly, since no main effect
was found for attitudes toward the mentally ill, the questions about what does influence
individuals’ attitudes toward the mentally ill remained. Here, we test the role that
personal familiarity or experience with the mentally ill plays in attitudes toward the
mentally ill.
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Perceived realism and transportation, presence.
Multiple Regression analysis demonstrated that perceived realism could, in fact,
predict transportation, while familiarity could not (Hypothesis 4). The study also
attempted to examine if the relationship could work in the other direction, such that
transportation would mediate perceived realism, as suggested by Green (2004).
A one-way ANOVA demonstrated just that: those who were highly transported
also significantly reported perceiving the content as more real. Highly transported
individuals reported (M = 5.32, SD = .769, N = 24) on perceived realism; comparatively,
low transported participants had (M = 4.42, SD = 1.26, N = 11, F (1, 35) = 6.77, p<.050,
η2 = .170). However, those who reported higher spatial presence (M = 4.966, SD = .714,
N = 11) did not report different perceived realism than those who were lowly transported
(M = 4.84, SD = 1.22, N = 17, F(1, 35) = .097, p=.758, η2 =.004. Results of these three
ANOVAs are displayed in Table 13
A third one-way ANOVA was used to test if those who were more highly
engaged (mental immersion presence) also differed in their perceived realism. They did:
the highly engaged group perceived the content as more real (M = 5.46, SD = .907, N =
17), than the less engaged (M = 4.62, SD = 1.04, N = 16, F(1, 35) = 6.238, p<.050, η2
=.168). Overall, transportation and engagement (mental immersion presence) were
significant indicators of increased perceived realism, while no significance was displayed
for spatial presence’s influence.
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Table 13
ANOVA of high and low transportation, spatial presence, and engagement (mental
immersion)’s influence on perceived realism.
M
SD
SS
df
MS
F
p
eta2
Low Transportation

4.42*

1.26

High Transportation

5.32*

.469

Low Spatial

4.84

1.23

4.96

.714

Low Engagement

4.62*

1.04

High Engagement

5.378

.86

35.674

34

.897

6.770

.014*

.170

29.292

27

1.122

.097

.758

.004

35.220

32

.946

6.238

.035*

.133

Presence
High Spatial
Presence

Note. **p<.001, *p<.05.

Sex and age differences.
Other additional analyses were run to test whether there were significant
differences among demographic groups. Responses differed by sex on only one variable:
perceived realism. Females were more likely to perceive the experimental stimuli as more
real (M = 5.37, SD = 1.03, N = 20) than their male counterparts (M = 4.59, SD = .864, N
= 15; F(1, 34) = 5.601, p<.050, η2 =.145.
While perceived realism was the only variable that differed by sex, attitudes
toward the mentally ill was the only variable that differed by age among the participants
in the experimental condition. Using a median split, the first measure of attitudes differed
such that older participants expressed more negative attitudes toward the mentally ill (M
= 4.12, SD = 3.53, N = 19) than younger ones (M = 3.33, SD = 2.96, N = 16; F(1, 34) =
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5.347, p=.027, η2 =.139. A difference at the second time measure was not significant, but
in the same direction.
Counter-arguing and transportation.
The third area of additional analysis examines the relationship directly between
counter-arguing and transportation. Although too few cases of counter-arguing were
present to test hypotheses related exclusively to the experimental condition (N = 7), an N
= 11 was found across conditions for evidence of some counter-arguing. An ANOVA was
utilized to test the relationship between counter-arguing and transportation. Despite
concerns of small sample size, a significant difference in levels of transportation was
found between those who counter-argued (M = 3.59, SD = .619, N = 11) and those who
did not (M = 4.39, SD = .951, N = 58; F(1, 68) = 7.183, p=<.010, , η2 = .097). So, those
who did not counter-argue experienced greater transportation. Results are in Table 14.

Table 14
ANOVA of counter-arguing’s relationship with transportation
Counter-Arguing:
M
SD
SS
df
MS
Present

3.59*

.619

Not Present

4.39*

.951

61.259

68

.826

F

p

eta2

7.183

.009

.097

Note. **p<.001, *p<.050.

Familiarity/experience with the mentally ill and transportation.
Lastly, because personal familiarity with the mentally ill was not found to be a
significant predictor of transportation and presence, analyses were completed in order to
assess whether personal familiarity with mental illness had a direct effect on attitudes
toward the mentally ill. A one-way ANOVA demonstrated that those who had increased
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familiarity with the mentally ill (M = 3.23, SD = .986, N = 31) had more positive
attitudes toward the mentally ill than those who had no to low personal familiarity or
experience with the mentally ill (M = 3.99, SD = .993, N = 30; F(1, 60) = 9.085, p<.010,
η2 = .133). Results are displayed in Table 15
Table 15
ANOVA of personal familiarity/experience with the mentally ill’s effect on attitudes
toward the mentally ill.
M
SD
SS
df
MS
F
p
eta2
High Familiarity

3.23*

.986

Low Familiarity

3.99*

.993

66.713

Note. **p<.001, *p<.050.

68

60

8.902

9.085

.004

.133

Table 16
Summary of hypothesis and research question testing
Hypothesis 1

Transportation will correlate

SUPPORTED

with three dimensions of
presence
Hypothesis 2

Personal familiarity with the

NOT SUPPORTED

mentally ill will lead to
increased counter-arguing
Hypothesis 3

Increased counter-arguing will

NOT SUPPORTED

lead to decreased perceived
realism
Hypothesis 4

Low perceived realism will lead

SUPPORTED

to lower transportation and
presence
Hypothesis 5

Viewing the experimental

NOT SUPPORTED

stimulus will leave participants
with more negative attitudes
toward the mentally ill
Hypothesis 6

Increased transportation will

NOT SUPPORTED

lead to greater story-consistent
attitude change
Hypothesis 7

Increased presence will lead to

NOT SUPPORTED

greater story-consistent attitude
change
Research Question 1

Will story-consistent beliefs
hold, diminish, or increase over
time
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ANSWERED,
DIMINISHED

Table 17
Summary of additional analyses
1. Those who more highly transported also perceived the content as being more real.
2. Those who experienced greater spatial presence did not differ on perceived realism.
3. Those who were more highly engaged (mental immersion presence) also perceived
the content as being more real.
4. Females exposed to the experimental condition reported greater perceived realism
than males.
5. Older participants reported more negative attitudes toward the mentally ill.
6. Those who counter-argued experienced less transportation than those who did not.
7. Those with higher familiarity/personal experience with the mentally ill expressed
more positive attitudes toward the mentally ill.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

General Discussion
Hypothesis 1.
As predicted in the first hypothesis, transportation correlates highly with the three
dimensions of presence that were measured. Of the three dimensions used from Lombard
& Ditton’s (2000) Temple Presence Inventory, the engagement (mental immersion)
dimension shared the highest correlation with transportation. Examining the individual
items that compose these measures yields a pool of items that appear very similar. Green
and Brock (2000) identify a three-factor solution of the transportation-imagery scale:
cognitive aspects, emotional-affective aspects, and visual imagery. At face value, the
cognitive aspects factor shares the most similarity with the engagement dimension of
presence identified by Lombard & Ditton (2000). The transportation scales’ “I was
mentally involved in the narrative while reading it,” mirrors Lombard & Ditton’s “To
what extent did you feel mentally involved in the experience.” As Bracken (2005) posits,
transportation and presence seem to be tapping into a similar process. Others have
discussed the similarities between these two theoretical models; however, this may be the
first study that has data to support these ideas about such similarities. Further discussion
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of the theoretical implications regarding transportation and presence can be found later
in this text.
Hypothesis 2-4, counter-arguing, perceived reality, personal familiarity.
The lack of counter-arguing that emerged presented difficulties in testing the
original predictions regarding personal familiarity or experience with mental illness,
counter-arguing and perceived realism’s effect on transportation and presence in
hypotheses 2 through 4. A lack of counter-arguing may have occurred for several
reasons. First, participants were asked to write down their thoughts while viewing the
episode immediately after viewing, and they may have declined to express negative
reactions for any number of reasons. Also, enjoyment of the episode may have
overridden individuals’ needs to doubt the realism, or participants may have wanted to
seem agreeable.
The lack of counter-arguing may be due to the distinct processing that occurs
when individuals view narrative entertainment content as opposed to persuasive
communications. Zhang, Hmielowski, and Busselle (2007) also reported small
percentages of participants showing evidence of counter-arguing in response to video
narratives. It is easy to imagine that participants would have been more dismissive of
details or characters if the content were an advertisement or a political speech. Despite
low occurrences of counter-arguing, additional analyses were employed in order to
examine how counter-arguing functions within processing of narratives. Results showed
that those who did not counter-argue experienced greater transportation. These results
could be indicative of the processing of narratives that Green and Brock (2000) articulate
as something very different than the dual-process models. The likelihood of counter-

72

arguing likely decreases as participants becomes more transported. The authors distinctly
differentiate the transportation-imagery model from the dual process models (ELM, Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986; HSM, Chaiken & Eagly, 1976) – the former may inherently create a
greater resistance to counter-arguing. Others have posited that counter-arguing should be
almost eliminated when transportation occurs because critical scrutiny of a message is at
odds with the suspension of disbelief that occurs when one is fully engaged (Slater, et al.,
2006). This offers further rationale for the low counts of counter-arguing found.
If a transported individual is being transported to or lost in a story, and loses some
access to one’s real-world facts, they may not be expected to critique or elaborate upon
story facts. This suspension of disbelief may be a necessary pre-condition of
transportation, as others have explored (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2006). Realism may also
be an outcome of transportation, as Green (2004) proposed. ANOVAs run as additional
analyses support this model as well.
The current study’s placement of perceived realism as a predictor of
transportation is in reverse order than Green’s (2004) model that posited that
transportation would mediate perceived realism, which would then influence storyconsistent attitude change. Although, Green notes,
“Of course, the reverse is also possible; it could be easier to become
transported into a narrative that seems plausible. The relationship may also
be bi-directional such that a story may have to meet some minimum level
of psychological plausibility for readers to become transported into it, but
once individuals are transported, the story may come to seem even more
realistic (p. 252).”
Busselle and Bilandzic (2006) postulated that perceived realism would predict
transportation into narrative films. Both Green (2004) and Busselle and Bilandzic (2006)
reported that their hypotheses were supported by showing significant correlations
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between the two variables. Green (2004) also found that realism was not a mediator of
transportation effects on story-consistent attitudes.
It would seem that the direction of the relationship between transportation and
perceived realism is one that is difficult to identify. The high correlation between these
two variables serves to further confound the direction of the relationship. Previous
research may have relied too heavily on correlation analyses to answer questions that are
directional in nature. Certainly, this study found the two to be highly correlated, in
addition to the discovery that both variables have the capacity to significantly predict the
other. Given the current findings, it is unclear if one always precedes the other, and the
idea that the relationship between perceived realism and transportation may be bidirectional is deserving of future research.
In the attempt to incorporate the concept of personal familiarity or experience
from hypotheses 2 and 3 into hypothesis 4, it was found that familiarity did not influence
transportation into the narrative. In retrospect, this relationship appears to be too
convoluted to have a direct effect. Contrary to prediction, there was a near significant
effect that those with higher familiarity with the mentally ill experienced a greater sense
of transportation, (p = .059), although the same effect was not found for the two
dimensions of presence also analyzed. These results mirror Green’s (2004) findings that
those with increased familiarity with homosexual friends and family members
experienced greater transportation into a story about a gay man returning to his old
fraternity’s alumni event. Those with increased familiarity with the fraternity and sorority
system in universities also experienced greater transportation. In the Green (2004) study,
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the portrayals of a gay man and a fraternity were not designed so that they were contrary
to real life gay men and fraternities.
This near-significant finding could be an indicator of a few different processes.
The mere presentation of a group of people, or an issue that individuals deal with on a
regular basis, may be more important than the accuracy of social realism of that
presentation. If a person lives with a mentally ill family member who is not violent,
perhaps the presence of an illness that one is familiar with creates a large enough
common ground from which to be transported from.
Hypothesis 5 and Research Question 1 – Main effect and second attitude measure.
Hypothesis 5, the basic test of that those who viewed the experimental stimulus
would express more negative attitudes toward the mentally ill than those who viewed the
control stimulus, was not supported. This may be due to both methodological and
theoretical or conceptual issues.
First, in future research, a pre-test of attitudes toward the mentally ill may be
beneficial. While others have noted that the stigma of the mentally ill persists in
Americans, despite the lessening of other traditional prejudices (Phelan & Link, 1998),
there is likely great variability among individual attitudes. Neither the manipulation nor
transportation or presence influenced attitudes toward mental illness. However, as the last
additional analysis shows, personal familiarity with the mentally ill did. Those who had
more experience and proximity to the mentally ill perceived them as less dangerous and
socially undesirable than those who do not. This finding is reversed from previous
findings that suggest narratives influenced attitudes toward drunk driving, while personal
familiarity played no role in the change of attitudes between times of measure (Rowe Stitt
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& Nabi, 2005). A preliminary assessment of attitudes toward the mentally ill would have
been necessary to capture genuine attitude change as opposed to adoption of storyconsistent beliefs.
It is also possible that results could vary across different topics presented in an
entertainment, narrative impact. For instance, Slater et al. (2006) found story-consistent
attitude change based on crime dramas espousing support for the death penalty, but not
for gay marriage rights. The nature of social issues may increase individual differences in
both attitudes and susceptibility to persuasion.
The manipulation may not have worked due both to the frequency that mental
illness is used as a plot device in prime-time dramas (Signorielli, 1989), and the degree to
which there is some moral ambiguity presented regarding blaming the mentally ill for
violent acts committed. While recent content analyses of mental illness in the media are
lacking, there is certainly no indication that portrayals of the mentally ill have drastically
changed in recent years. Crime dramas continue to attract large audiences and weave
mental illness into storylines.
The specific episode of Law & Order SVU that was used in the current study may
have displayed too much sympathy for the man with schizophrenia that was guilty of
raping and murdering multiple young women. The ending shows the man paying the
price for his crimes, but also beginning to feel remorse for his actions due to the
treatment he is receiving for his schizophrenia. Law & Order SVU may have presented a
character too complex to be simply labeled mentally ill and violent.
Further confounding the non-significant findings for a main effect of the
manipulation are the results concerning the second measure of attitudes toward the
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mentally ill. Although no differences in attitudes were found between the experimental
and control conditions at the first time of measure, there was a significant difference
between the first and second attitude measures of participants in the experimental
condition. These differences in attitude measures were consistent with what could
logically be expected: immediately after viewing the experimental stimuli, participants
expressed significantly more negative attitudes toward the mentally ill when compared to
how they evaluated the dangerousness and undesirability of the mentally ill 2 to 3 weeks
later. There was no such diminishing of negative attitudes toward the mentally ill among
those in the control group.
In fact, attitudes toward the mentally ill at both time points among control
participants (M = 3.38 at the first measure, M = 3.28 at the second) were quite similar to
the attitudes of the experimental group at the second measure of attitudes (M = 3.29).
Participants who viewed the experimental stimuli expressed more negative attitudes (M =
3.78) at the first time point measure, where higher scores indicate more negative
attitudes. Although conclusions about these findings cannot begin to be close to
conclusive, given the lack of effect of manipulation, these analyses provide numbers that
follow a promising trend. The mean score for those in the experimental condition
immediately after viewing the content seem to be inflated in contrast to the other scores.
If there was more statistical support, one may conclude that effects of the content were
not powerful and long lasting – after viewing, participants expressed more negative
attitudes toward the mentally ill, but the effects quickly diminished after the episode was
put out of their minds. This finding is a unique contribution to the research fields
examining memory source retrieval systems. It remains unclear as to what other factors
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could have played a role in lessening negative attitudes toward the mentally ill during the
few week period between measures of attitudes.
Hypotheses 6 & 7.
Levels of transportation across conditions were similar or slightly higher when
compared to previous studies that measured transportation (Green, 2004; Zhang et al.,
2007). Despite satisfactory levels of transportation, high levels of transportation did not
indicate increased story-consistent beliefs, as hypothesis 6 posited, nor did presence serve
to increase these beliefs. Research exploring presence as a mediator of attitude change
within the area of persuasion (not necessarily narrative) has also shown it to have positive
relationships with brand knowledge and buying intention (Kim & Biocca, 1997; Li et al.,
2001). This study did not replicate these findings. However, these results become
difficult to interpret since a main effect for the manipulation was not found. Had
hypothesis 5 been supported, and hypotheses 6 and 7 not supported, this could have been
an interesting finding that would not have fit within the somewhat scarce literature on the
topic of transportation and presence mediating attitudes. However, since hypothesis 5
was not supported, it is unclear if hypotheses 6 and 7 not being supported as well is an
artifact of a lack of manipulation effect.
Additional analyses.
The finding of females perceiving the experimental condition as more real than
males, yet that difference in perceived realism not creating a difference in attitudes about
the mentally ill is interesting. While the finding was significant, the power of this
relationship was only moderate. Differences in perceived realism are not typically found
across the sexes (Green, 2004), although in many studies differences may not have been
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reported or examined. This increase in perceived realism does not create a group that is
significantly more inclined to differ on transportation, presence or attitudes.
A median split on age of participants revealed that the older half of participants,
across conditions, had more negative views toward the mentally ill. Age was not a
significant predictor of outcome on any other variable. This may be attributed to a
number of things, one of which may be that these individuals have been exposed to
content that stereotypically portrays the mentally ill as violent and unstable over a longer
period of time. Differences of where individuals are in their life cycles may influence
their attitudes toward a perceivably violent groups as well – perhaps young parents would
be more cautious of a group of people who are stigmatized as violent than a young
college student who grew up with constant advertisements for prescription drugs. Both
gender and age present issues that require additional research before conclusions can be
made.
Theoretical contributions – transportation and presence
Utilizing data to explore the similarities between transportation and presence is a
unique contribution to both areas of study. Central to both concepts is the idea of “being
there,” (Lombard & Ditton, 1997) being “lost in a story” (Green & Brock, 2000), or
exchanging access to one’s real world surroundings for immersion in a mediated
environment. There may be some differences between the two concepts, as some
variables have been tested in only one arena (i.e. content vs. form). However, other
variables, such as persuasion and perceived realism, function in similar ways in both
frameworks. This study further demonstrates how the two function together: perceived
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realism was found to increase both transportation and (engagement, mental immersion)
presence, while personal familiarity was found to not influence either of them.
Given that transportation and the three dimensions of presence involved acted in
corresponding ways, it is important to note that the two share a very common conceptual
background. However, more research on distinguishing differences between the two
concepts is needed. Transportation appeared to function much in the same way that the
engagement (mental immersion) dimension of presence did. These two variables also
shared a higher correlation than the other two dimensions of presence. Further research
exploring what aspects of spatial presence differ from transportation could prove very
insightful. Future research examining how social presence would fit into transportation
and identification would advance both fields as well.
Further testing and refinement of transportation, presence and perceived realism
scales would also help to differentiate different concepts. The Temple Presence Inventory
separates 7 dimensions of presence, and differentiating between a feeling of being
transported to a different place and the social realism of the environment was beneficial
in terms of analyzing different variables across these different concepts. Testing Green’s
(2004) perceived realism scale in directional relationships with transportation posed
greater difficulty because of how highly the two were correlated.
Lastly, cleaner conceptualizations of transportation and, perhaps to a lesser extent,
presence are needed. There are theoretical ambiguities in both lines of research that make
some ideas and findings hard to test and interpret. The transportation-imagery model is
clearly an important framework: tying the feelings of being lost in a story to attitude
change is an important addition to the field. Green and Brock (2000) are quick to
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differentiate the processing of narrative content to that of the dual-process models (e.g.
ELM; HSM. In addition to the three dimensions of transportation that the transportationimagery model measures (cognitive, emotional, and imagery), items 10 and 11 appear to
be measuring how a person is changed by the experience, a distinct concept in itself. ).
However, the transportation literature offers no clear model on the specifics of the
psychological processing of narratives. More work to clarify this “convergent process” of
narrative (Green & Brock, 2000) would be helpful in the future.
The lack of counter-arguing demonstrated in this study adds to the line of research
suggesting that there is something distinct about the processing of narratives. More
research cleanly defining what that is, and how it relates to concepts such as attention,
emotional responses, imagery, perceived realism, and prior familiarity or experience with
the topic, is needed.
Research regarding presence and attitude change shares one, and still unanswered
question – What specifically about being lost in a story, or a feeling of “being there,”
with a story or mediated environment changes attitudes? Overall, there is much future
research that should be explored regarding transportation and presence. This study was
able to offer data that supports conceptual similarities between the two.
Limitations
As mentioned in the discussion of hypothesis 5, replicating similar studies with
the use of a pre-test questionnaire on attitude items may be very helpful. This study was
only able to examine story-consistent attitudes, as compared to genuine attitude change
about the mentally ill based on pre- and post-test measures. This may have been the
largest limitation of the current study. If a pre-test were administered, separations of
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those with high and low familiarity with the mentally ill could have been made, and
balanced across cells.
Another limitation of this study was the content used. A viewer may have
perceived that others in the episode felt some degree of sympathy for the killer, even if
they were revolted by his actions. Mental illness in general may not have been the most
ideal social issue to tap into due to its frequent, and varied, presentation in crime dramas.
More complete research could examine a variety of issues that may be influenced by
entertainment narratives.
Methodologically, the small number of participants that counter-argued limited
what analyses could be done with the data. Counter-arguing may better be conceptualized
as a part of having low perceived realism, rather than being a separate process. Since the
current study supports Slater et al.’s (2006) and Tal-Or et al.’s (2004) conclusions that
narrative content inherently dissuades individuals from counter-arguing, perhaps reconceptualization of this message in research examining narrative content may be
helpful. Future studies could examine counter-arguing responses to more purposefully
chosen inflammatory content.
The current study is also limited in regard to the student sample used. Especially
given the attitude differences about the mentally ill among younger and older
participants, more consideration to the sample and population being studied should be
considered in the future.
Future Research
In addition to future research further conceptualizing transportation and presence,
results of this study demonstrate the need for future research in several areas.
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First, further exploration of both presence and transportation should be
investigated. It would be interesting to utilize measures of both of these concepts in a
variety of different mediums – print, video games, online, and in virtual environments.
Examining different types of content in the future is key as well. Looking at presence,
transportation, and perceived realism in regards to very realistic content, like
documentaries, and contrasting it with fantasy-type fiction may help illuminate the role
that specific content plays in both processes.
In addition to examining different types of narrative content, and perhaps quality
of content, it would be interesting to re-examine some of the form variables that those in
the presence field have examined at greater length than those working under the
transportation framework. Would presence and transportation react in the same way in
regards to form variables, such as high-definition screen image quality? Future research
in both presence and transportation frameworks would be well served to further explore
similarities found between the two concepts on a variety of form and content based
variables.
Secondly, more research on the effect that transportation or presence has on
attitude change is needed. While it is incredibly useful and interesting to know what
makes individuals feel more transported to a different place, discovering how individuals
apply what they learned from this place to which they were transported to their
unmediated lives may help researchers in many fields, perhaps most notably
entertainment-education.
Perceived realism of content seems inherently tied to both theoretical constructs,
as well as gender, and further research isolating a directional path between these variables
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would be excellent. Based on the lack of counter-arguing found in this study, as well as
other researchers’ claims that narratives inherently dissuade counter-arguing, more work
with this measure could add very much to the field. Future studies examining counterarguing and narratives may want to over-sample participants in order to attain a high
number of counter-arguers. Analyses looking at counter-arguing and perceived realism
and attitude measures at later times may also provide some interesting results.
Thirdly, the current research also raises questions about the nature of attitude
change over time based on media messages. If attitudes are changed for only a brief time,
what types of attitudes can never be changed? What types of attitudes are the most easily
swayed by entertainment narratives? How much of how we view the world is based on
the most recent television shows we have seen? These are questions that related research
could work toward answering. Although the current study was not able to replicate other
research that found significant effects for attitudes about social issues based on their
presentation in a fictional narrative, it would be premature to rule out the probability of
this process occurring at some times, on some issues, and for some people. Exploring
when this happens and when it does not deserves future research.
Conclusion
Although a main effect for the manipulation in the current experiment did not
work, many implications can be derived from this study. Although the theoretical
frameworks of transportation and presence seemingly share many similarities, both in
conceptualizations and measurements, to date, this study has been the first to demonstrate
these similarities with data. Transportation and the engagement (mental immersion)
dimension of presence (Lombard & Ditton 2000) shared a very high correlation, and it
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was these two scales that were tied to perceived realism – not spatial presence. This
finding is among the first to begin to parse out where the similarities and differences lie
between the two constructs.
Findings and non-findings alike regarding the roles of counter-arguing in response
to narratives, personal familiarity/experience with an issue presented in a narrative, and
perceived realism provide reason for future related research. This study found that
familiarity with mental illness was not a predictor of realism judgments regarding their
stereotypical portrayals in a crime drama, a finding that suggests entertainment narratives
may inhibit counter-arguing. Variables that affect perceived realism are then related to
the transportation and presence felt.
This study also found interesting, although inconclusive, insight into the nature of
attitude change based on a media experience over time. Significant findings on attitudes
toward the mentally ill were not found between the experimental and control conditions
at the first time of measurement. However, those in the experimental condition expressed
significantly more negative attitudes toward the mentally ill at the first time of attitude
measure than the second time of measurement, 2-3 weeks later. Overall, the current
research produced a number of findings regarding presence, transportation and attitude
change.
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Endnotes
1

Researchers compared answers to an open-ended question regarding respondents'
understanding of the term "mental illness" from two nationally representative surveys,
one conducted in 1950 and one in 1996. Among respondents who mention violence in
their description of a mentally ill person, the percentage who use "dangerous to self or
others" phrasing to indicate this belief increased substantially, from 4.2% in 1950 to
44.0% in 1996.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE
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Crime Drama Study
Questionnaire

Last 4 digits of CSU ID: __________

Section 1
On the lines provided below, please spend a few minutes writing down the
thoughts that crossed your mind and how you were feeling when you were
watching the episode. Do not worry about spelling, grammar or
punctuation.
__________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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Please circle T for True or F for False for the following 10 statements about the television
episode you just viewed.
1. 1. Tree leaves found in the rental car and on the victim’s body led the
police back to Saul Picard.
T

F

2. Saul mentioned “Harken to the arc” to Sabrina after he took her from the
book store.
T
F
3. Saul’s escape was sparked by a message written on a passing truck.
T

F

4. The doctor said the Det. Stabler’s eyesight could return in a few months or
years.
T
F
5. The feds want to extradite Saul Picard to Louisiana because they want to
save him from New York’s ability to put him to death.
T

F

6. Francine is Saul Picard’s sister who was raped when he was 17.
T

F

7. The police psychiatrist says that Saul Picard is schizophrenic, not a
pedophile.
T
F
8. Once Saul Picard’s medication kicks in, he wants to “go home to die.”
T

F

9. Dets. Benson and Stabler believe that the district attorney is treating Saul
Picard too harshly.
T
F
10. As Saul Picard begins to mentally get better, he begins to feel a lot of
remorse for what he did.
T
F
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Please note – participants in the experimental condition answered the above 10 recall
items – those in the control condition responded to the 10 below.
Please circle T for True or F for False for the following 10 statements about the television
episode you just viewed.
1.

The volunteers that found Nikkiel’s body were discussing movies at the time of
discovering her body.
T

2.

The medical examiner, Dr. Warner found splinters in the dead woman’s wounds.
T

3.

4.

F

F

The detectives acknowledge that a 14-year-old can be married with the proper
paperwork in the state of New York.
T
F
Chukwei Bothame, the dead woman’s husband, makes beautiful iron sculptures.
T
F

5.

Chukwei is a on the website “Lie or Die,” and all of his personal information is
available as well.
T
F

6.

D King, the man whose trial Chukwei was to testify at, claimed he was at the
cemetery not trying to intimidate Chukwei, but to pay his respects to his mother.
T

F

7.

The detectives discuss polygamy with Chukwei’s other wives, Alwaani and
Sarah, after they have reached the hotel that they must stay at.
T
F

8.

D King is on trial for killing a young man who stole drugs from him.
T
F

9.

Sarah killed Nikki after a fight because she was jealous of how their husband
loved her.
T
F

10.

Chukwei and his family’s lives are threatened by D King in court, and Chukwei
tells Detective Benson that he is afraid.
T
F
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11. The episode I just watched dealt with the issue of mental illness.
Strongly Disagree

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

12. The character(s) portrayed as committing murder in this episode displayed signs of
mental illness
Strongly Disagree

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

Section 2
For the following items, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the
following statements, where 1 means you do not agree at all, and 7 means you agree
very much. Please refer to the show that you just watched while answering these
items.
1.

While I was viewing the show, I could easily picture the events in it taking place.
Not at all

2.

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

6

7

Very much

6

7

Very much

I wanted to learn how the show ended.
Not at all

7.

5

After viewing the show, it was easy to put it out of my mind.
Not at all

6.

4

I was mentally involved with the video while watching it.
Not at all

5.

3

I could picture myself in some of the scenes depicted on screen.
Not at all

4.

2

While I was watching the episode, activity going on in the room around me was
on my mind.
Not at all

3.

1

1

2

3

4

5

The show affected me emotionally.
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

105

8.

I found myself thinking of ways the show could have turned out differently.
Not at all

9.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

Events that have actually happened or could happen are discussed in this
narrative.
Strongly Disagree

18.

1

The way people actually live their everyday lives is not accurately portrayed in
this story.
Strongly Disagree

17.

Very much

People in this show are like people you or I might actually know.
Strongly Disagree

16.

7

The setting for the narrative just doesn’t seem real.
Strongly Disagree

15.

6

The dialogue in the episode is realistic and believable.
Strongly Disagree

14.

5

I had a vivid imagery of the characters while I was watching this show.
Not at all

13.

4

The events in the narrative changed my life.
Not at all

12.

3

The events in the program are relevant to my everyday life.
Not at all

11.

2

I found my mind wandering while watching the television program.
Not at all

10.

1

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

This episode shows that people have both good and bad sides.
Strongly Disagree

1

2 3 4

5 6 7
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Strongly Agree

19.

I have a hard time believing people in this narrative are real because the basic
situation is so far-fetched.
Strongly Disagree

20.

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

This narrative deals with the very difficult choices people in real life have to
make.
Strongly Disagree

1

2 3 4

5 6 7

Strongly Agree

Please continue with the media experience you just had in mind.
21. How much did it seem as if the objects and people you saw/heard had come to the
place you were?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

22. How much did it seem as if you could reach out and touch the objects or people you
saw/heard?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

23. How often when an object seemed to be headed toward you did you want to move to
get out of its way?
Never

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Always

24. To what extent did you experience a sense of 'being there' inside the environment you
saw/heard?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

25. To what extent did it seem that sounds came from specific, different locations?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

26. How often did you want to or try to touch something you saw/heard?
Never

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Always

27. Did the experience seem more like looking at the events/people on a movie screen or
more like looking at the events/people through a window?
Like a movie screen

1

2

3

4
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5

6

7

Like a window

28. To what extent did you feel mentally immersed in the experience?
Not at all
1 2 3 4 5
29. How involving was the media experience?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

6

7

Very much

6

7

Very much

30. How completely were your senses engaged?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

31. To what extent did you experience a sensation of reality?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

32. How relaxing or exciting was the experience?
Very relaxing

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very exciting

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

33. How engaging was the story?
Not at all

1

34. The way in which the events I saw/heard occurred is a lot like the way they occur in
the real world.
Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

35. The events I saw/heard could occur in the real world.
Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

36. It is likely that the events I saw/heard would occur
Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Section 3
The following items are about your own attitudes and beliefs about various issues.
Please circle one of the numbers provided under each statement, where 1 means you
strongly disagree, and 7 means you strongly agree.
Some of the questions ask your opinions about mental illness. While mental
illness can be both broadly and narrowly defined, please use the following definition
of mental illness for the purpose of this study:
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Mental illness: “Any of various psychiatric disorders or diseases, usually characterized
by impairment of thought, mood, or behavior, including diseases of the mind and
personality and certain diseases of the brain. Please keep in mind that mental illness may
be severe to moderate in nature. For the purpose of this study, please do not consider
those with addiction issues or developmental disorders that limit one’s intellectual ability
as the mentally ill.”
1.

I prefer to live in suburban or rural areas because the crime is lower there than
in urban areas.
Strongly Disagree

2.

Strongly Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Violent criminals are often easy to pick out in a crowd.
Strongly Disagree

9.

7

The mentally ill commit far more violent crimes than those who do not suffer a
mental illness.
Strongly Disagree

8.

6

In dealing with others, you can’t be too careful.
Strongly Disagree

7.

5

The legal system adequately deals with mentally ill criminals.
Strongly Disagree

6.

4

Those who have been diagnosed with a mental illness should be forced, through
whatever means necessary, to undergo treatment and medication prescribed by their
doctor.
Strongly Disagree

5.

3

The mentally ill should not be denied their individual rights.
Strongly Disagree

4.

2

The mentally ill are a burden on society.
Strongly Disagree

3.

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

The mentally ill pose a great threat to those around them as well a strangers.
Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5
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6

7

Strongly Agree

10.

Rehabilitation programs for people who are convicted of violent offenses are a
waste of time and energy.
Strongly Disagree

11.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

I often take measures to ensure my personal safety.
Strongly Disagree

12.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

I would not want to live next door to someone who suffers a severe mental
illness.
Strongly Disagree

13.

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

6

7

Strongly Agree

Violent crimes can happen to anyone.
Strongly Disagree

14.

1

2

3

4

5

Most people are just looking out for themselves.
Strongly Disagree

15.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

“Do unto others before they do unto you” is a good motto to have.
Strongly Disagree

16.

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

When the mentally ill are correctly treated for their disease, they are less likely
to commit violent crimes.
Strongly Disagree

17.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Violent offenders often use mental illness as an excuse in hopes of getting off
easier.
Strongly Disagree

18.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Practically all violent crimes have been increasing for years.
Strongly Disagree

19.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

We need to adopt a far more tolerant attitude toward the mentally ill in our
society.
Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

110

6

7

Strongly Agree

20.

I would feel comfortable with my children having contact with a person with a
mental illness.
Strongly Disagree

21.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Violent criminals don’t deserve second chances.
Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Section 4
Please answer the next set of questions about yourself, where 1 means you strongly
disagree with the statement and 7 means you strongly agree.
1.

I am in regular contact with someone who suffers from either a minor or severe
mental illness.
Strongly Disagree

2.

1

1

2

1

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Violent crime has touched someone close to me.
Strongly Disagree

5.

4

A person, or people who are close to me have dealt with a mental illness.
Strongly Disagree

4.

3

My job requires that I work with or around people diagnosed with mental illness.
Strongly Disagree

3.

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

I am in regular contact with someone who has been victimized by violent crime.
Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

Section 5
This last set of items is about your television viewing habits, and also includes a few
demographic questions.
1.

How often do you watch crime or law-oriented programs (for example, any Law
& Order, any CSI, Without A Trace, Shark, Boston Legal)?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Very often

2.

When you watch crime or law related programming, how much attention do you
generally pay to the television show?
None at all

3.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very much

What is your favorite type of dramatic TV show? Please circle one.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Medical Drama (ex. E.R.)
Primetime soap (ex. Desperate Housewives)
Crime/Legal Drama (ex. CSI)
Science Fiction/Fantasy (ex. Lost)
Other Drama

4.

What is your age, in years?
__________________

5.

Are you male or female? Please circle one.
Male

6.

Female
What is your racial/ethnic background?

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

White/Caucasian
Black/African-American
Asian/Asian-American
Hispanic/Hispanic-American
American Indian/Native American
Mixed
Other

7.

Before today, had you ever seen the episode that you just watched?
Yes

No

Not sure

THANK YOU!!!!!!!! You are done!
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Table B1
Factor Analysis Results of the Transportation Scale (Green & Brock, 2000)
Factor 1
Factor 2
Communalities
Trans 9 (R)

.812

-.068

.664

Trans 4

.793

.222

.678

Trans 2 (R)

.732

.104

.547

Trans 6

.714

.137

.528

Trans 1

.549

.210

.345

Trans11

-.070

.813

.665

Trans 7

.265

.648

.490

Trans 10

.019

.643

.414

Trans 8

.133

.576

.349

Trans 12

.146

.536

.308

Trans 5 (R)

.418

.539

.465

Trans 3

.456

.480

.438

Eigen Value

3.132

2.760

Percent of Total Variance

26.101%

23.000%

49.101% (Total)

Percent of Common Variance

53.15%

46.84%

100% (Total)

Note. KMO = .781, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, Approx. Chi Square = 245.172, p<.001. df = 66
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Transportation scale items (1-7 likert-type scale, 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much):
Trans 1: While I was viewing the show, I could easily picture the events in it taking
place.
Trans 2: While I was watching the episode, activity going on in the room around me was
on my mind.
Trans 3: I could easily picture myself in some of the scenes depicted on screen.
Trans 4: I was mentally involved with the video while watching it
Trans 5: After viewing the show, it was easy to put it out of my mind.
Trans 6: I wanted to learn how the show ended.
Trans 7: The show affected me emotionally.
Trans 8: I found myself thinking of ways the show could have turned out differently.
Trans 9: I found my mind wandering while watching the television program.
Trans 10: The events in the program are relevant to my everyday life.
Trans 11: The events in the narrative changed my life.
Trans 12: I had a vivid imagery of the characters while I was watching this show.
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Table B2
Factor Analysis Narrative Perceived Realism Scale (Green, 2004)
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3

Communalities

Dialog

.886

.190

-.129

.838

Setting (R)

.747

.256

.258

.691

FarFetch (R)

.533

.298

.416

.546

GoodBad

.172

.844

-.013

.741

Choices

.183

.581

.131

.389

Likeppl

.064

.558

.498

.563

Actually

.027

.193

.826

.721

Portray (R)

.547

-.292

.611

.757

Eigen Value

1.994

1.674

1.578

Percent of Total Variance

24.930%

20.921%

19.720%

65.571%(Total)

Percent of Common

38.01%

31.90%

30.07%

100%(Total)

Variance
Note. KMO = .691, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, Approx. Chi Square = 127.434, p<.001. df = 28

Green’s (2004) Perceived Realism Scale (7-point likert-scale, where 1 = Strongly
Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree)
Dialog: The dialogue in this episode is realistic and believable.
Setting (R): The setting for this narrative just doesn’t seem real.
FarFetch (R): I have a hard time believing people in this narrative because the basic
situation is so far-fetched.
GoodBad: This episode shows that people have both good and bad sides.
Choices: This narrative deals with the very difficult choices people in real life have to
make.
Likeppl: People in this show are like people you or I might know.
Actually: Events that have actually happened or could happen are discussed in this
narrative.
Portray (R): The way people actually live their everyday lives is not accurately portrayed
in this story.
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Table B3
Factor Analysis of Spatial presence dimension (Lombard & Ditton, 2000)
Factor 1
Communalities
Object

.885

.782

Touchsmg

.882

.788

Touch

.739

.546

Bethere

.718

.516

Place

.674

.455

Sndlocal

.673

.453

Window

.488

.238

Eigen Value

3.768

Percent of Total Variance

53.828%

Note. KMO = .805, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, Approx. Chi Square = 225.801, p<.001. df = 21

Spatial presence items (Lombard & Ditton, 2000) 7-point likert-type scale, semantic
differentials
Object: How often when an object seemed to be heading toward you did you want to
move to get out of its way?
Touchsmg: How often did you want to or try to touch something you saw or heard?
Touch: How much did it seem as if you could reach out and touch the objects or people
you saw/heard?
Bethere: To what extent did you experience a sense of being there inside the environment
you saw/heard?
Place: How much did it seem as if the people you saw/heard had come to the place you
were?
Sndlocal: To what extent did it seem that sounds came from specific, different locations?
Window: Did the experience seem more like looking at the events/people on a movie
screen or like looking at the events/people through a window?
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Table B4
Factor Analysis of Engagement (mental immersion) presence dimension (Lombard &
Ditton, 2000)
Factor 1
Communalities
Senseeng

.844

.712

Involving

.841

.707

Sensreal

.783

.612

Engstory

.735

.541

Mentalim

.541

.293

Exciting

.484

.234

Eigen Value

3.099

Percent of Total Variance

51.656%

Note. KMO = .827, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, Approx. Chi Square = 129.912, p<.001. df = 15

Engagement (mental immersion) presence scale 1-7 point likert-type scale (1 = Not at all,
7 = Very much)
Senseeng: How completely were your senses engaged?
Involving: How involving was the media experience?
Sensreal: To what extent did you experience a sensation of reality?
Engstory: How engaging was the story?
Mentalim: To what extent did you feel mentally immersed in the experience?
Exciting: How relaxing or exciting was the experience?

118

Table B5
Factor Analysis of social realism presence dimension (Lombard & Ditton, 2000)
Factor 1
Communalities
Ocrworld

.891

.709

Couldocr

.869

.756

Wouldocr

.842

.793

Eigen Value

2.258

Percent of Total Variance

75.270%

Note. KMO = .715, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, Approx. Chi Square = 79.123, p<.001. df = 3

Social Realism dimension of presence, 1-7 point likert-type scale (1 = Strongly disagree,
7 = Strongly agree)
Ocrworld: The way in which the events I saw/heard occurred is a lot like the way they
occur in the real world
Couldocr: The events I saw/heard could occur in the real world
Wouldocr: The events I saw/heard would occur in the real world
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Table C1
Means for individual mental illness attitude items (at the first time of measure) in the
Experimental condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were
measured a 1-7 point likert-type scale
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Deny (R) – The mentally ill
should not be denied their
1.94
1.65
2.94
2.13
individual rights
2. Childmi (R) – I would feel
comfortable with my children
having contact with a person
4.87
1.89
4.65
1.90
with a mental illness.
3. Tolernt (R) – We need to
adopt far more tolerant attitudes
3.06
1.44
3.94
1.59
toward the mentally ill in our
society.
4. Burden – The mentally ill are
a burden on society.
3.37
1.62
2.88
1.93
5. Forced – Those who have
been diagnosed with a mental
illness should be forced, through
whatever means necessary, to
4.31
2.33
5.47
1.58
undergo treatment and
medication prescribed by their
doctor.
6. Farmore – The mentally ill
commit far more violent crimes
than those who do not suffer a
2.75
1.69
2.94
1.43
mental illness.
7. Threat – The mentally ill pose
a great threat to those around
3.25
1.57
3.88
1.65
them as well as strangers.
8. Nxtdoor – I would not want to
live next door to someone who
5.06
1.69
4.35
2.02
suffers a severe mental illness.
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050
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Table C2
Means for individual mental illness attitude items (at the first time of measure) in the
Control condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured a 1-7
point likert-type scale
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Deny (R) – The mentally ill
should not be denied their
2.29
1.05
2.50
2.03
individual rights
2. Childmi (R) – I would feel
comfortable with my children
4.76
1.34
4.19
1.72
having contact with a person
with a mental illness.
3. Tolernt (R) – We need to
adopt far more tolerant attitudes
3.65
1.32
3.06
1.44
toward the mentally ill in our
society.
4. Burden – The mentally ill are
3.00
1.66
3.012
1.25
a burden on society.
5. Forced – Those who have
been diagnosed with a mental
illness should be forced, through
4.29
1.64
4.25
1.94
whatever means necessary, to
undergo treatment and
medication prescribed by their
doctor.
6. Farmore – The mentally ill
commit far more violent crimes
2.94
1.34
2.73
1.79
than those who do not suffer a
mental illness.
7. Threat – The mentally ill pose
a great threat to those around
3.23
1.25
3.81
1.79
them as well as strangers.
8. Nxtdoor – I would not want to
live next door to someone who
4.65
1.80
3.87
1.82
suffers a severe mental illness.
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050
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Table C3
Means for individual mental illness attitude items (at the second time of measure) in the
Experimental condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured
a 1-7 point likert-type scale
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Deny (R) – The mentally ill
should not be denied their
2.445
1.91
2.18
1.07
individual rights
2. Childmi (R) – I would feel
comfortable with my children
having contact with a person
4.36
2.20
3.81
1.16
with a mental illness.
3. Tolernt (R) – We need to
adopt far more tolerant attitudes
toward the mentally ill in our
2.54
1.21
2.64
.92
society.
4. Burden – The mentally ill are
a burden on society.
3.45
1.86
2.18
1.40
5. Forced – Those who have
been diagnosed with a mental
illness should be forced, through
whatever means necessary, to
4.54
2.02
4.81
1.47
undergo treatment and
medication prescribed by their
doctor.
6. Farmore – The mentally ill
commit far more violent crimes
than those who do not suffer a
3.18
1.32
3.54
.82
mental illness.
7. Threat – The mentally ill pose
a great threat to those around
2.81
1.16
2.90
1.22
them as well as strangers.
8. Nxtdoor – I would not want to
live next door to someone who
3.90
1.51
3.36
1.36
suffers a severe mental illness.
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050.
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Table C4
Means for individual mental illness attitude items (at the second time of measure) in the
Control condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured a 1-7
point likert-type scale
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Deny (R) – The mentally ill
should not be denied their
3.44
1.94
2.20
1.47
individual rights
2. Childmi (R) – I would feel
comfortable with my children
having contact with a person
4.66
1.80
3.80
1.31
with a mental illness.
3. Tolernt (R) – We need to
adopt far more tolerant attitudes
3.88
1.76
3.00
1.24
toward the mentally ill in our
society.
4. Burden – The mentally ill are
a burden on society.
2.00
1.32
2.60
1.17
5. Forced – Those who have
been diagnosed with a mental
illness should be forced, through
whatever means necessary, to
4.00
1.11
3.40
1.57
undergo treatment and
medication prescribed by their
doctor.
6. Farmore – The mentally ill
commit far more violent crimes
than those who do not suffer a
3.44
1.94
3.10
1.52
mental illness.
7. Threat – The mentally ill pose
a great threat to those around
2.88
1.36
3.30
1.56
them as well as strangers.
8. Nxtdoor – I would not want to
live next door to someone who
3.66
1.58
4.20
1.75
suffers a severe mental illness.
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050
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Table C5
Means for individual Perceived Realism Scale items (Green, 2004) in the Experimental
condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured a 1-7 point
likert-type scale
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Dialog – The dialogue in this
episode is realistic and
4.56
1.82
5.71
1.61
believable.
2. Setting (R) – The setting for
this narrative just doesn’t seem
5.37
1.40
6.00
1.06
real.
3. Likeppl – People in this show
are just like people I might
1.78
1.90
3.12*
4.47*
actually know.
4. Portray (R) – The way people
actually live their everyday lives
is not accurately portrayed in
4.56
1.89
4.76
1.75
this study.
5. Actually – Events that have
actually happened or could
happen are discussed in this
1.39
1.17
4.75*
5.65*
narrative.
6. Goodbad – This episode
shows that people have both
5.12
2.09
5.59
1.27
good and bad sides.
7. Farfetch (R) – I have a hard
time believing people in this
narrative are real because the
4.44
1.54
5.06
1.43
basic situation is so far-fetched.
8. Choices – This narrative deals
with very difficult choices
5.00
1.89
5.71
1.21
people in real life have to make.
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050
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Table C6
Means for individual Perceived Realism Scale items (Green, 2004) in the Control
condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured a 1-7 point
likert-type scale
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Dialog – The dialogue in this
episode is realistic and
4.88
1.45
5.38
1.41
believable.
2. Setting (R) – The setting for
this narrative just doesn’t seem
1.31
1.05
5.29*
6.18*
real.
3. Likeppl – People in this show
are just like people I might
1.66
1.86
2.58*
4.44*
actually know.
4. Portray (R) – The way people
actually live their everyday lives
is not accurately portrayed in
1.83
1.83
4.12*
5.75*
this study.
5. Actually – Events that have
actually happened or could
happen are discussed in this
1.50
1.08
5.00*
6.12*
narrative.
6. Goodbad – This episode
shows that people have both
5.35
1.06
5.94
1.12
good and bad sides.
7. Farfetch (R) – I have a hard
time believing people in this
narrative are real because the
1.73
1.02
4.59*
5.88*
basic situation is so far-fetched.
8. Choices – This narrative deals
with very difficult choices
4.41
1.83
5.13
1.82
people in real life have to make.
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050
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Table C7
Means for individual Spatial presence items (Lombard & Ditton, 2000) in the
Experimental condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured
a 1-7 point scales, and one semantic differential
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Place – How much did it seem
as if objects and people you
saw/heard had come to the place
2.37
1.26
3.41
1.90
you were?
2. Touch – How much did it
seem as if you could reach out
and touch the objects or people
1.68
1.08
2.41
1.42
you saw/heard?
3. Object – How often when an
object seemed to heading toward
you did you want to move you
1.25
1.00
1.59
.94
get out of its way?
4. Bethere – To what extent did
you experience a sense of ‘being
there’ inside the environment
1.36
1.90
2.38*
3.65*
you saw/heard?
5. Sndlocal – To what extent did
it seem that sounds came from
2.50
1.96
3.23
1.48
specific, different locations?
6. Touchsmg – How often did
you want or try to touch
1.19
.75
1.59
1.12
something you saw/heard?
7. Window – Did the experience
seem more like looking at the
events/people on a movie screen
or more like looking at the
2.38
2.03
2.41
2.09
events/people through a
window.
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050
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Table C8
Means for individual Spatial presence items (Lombard & Ditton, 2000) in the Control
condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured a 1-7 point
scales, and one semantic differential
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Place – How much did it seem
as if objects and people you
saw/heard had come to the place
2.47
1.37
3.69
1.62
you were?
2. Touch – How much did it
seem as if you could reach out
and touch the objects or people
2.24
1.39
3.19
1.94
you saw/heard?
3. Object – How often when an
object seemed to heading toward
you did you want to move you
1.35
.79
2.13
1.96
get out of its way?
4. Bethere – To what extent did
you experience a sense of ‘being
there’ inside the environment
2.12
1.27
3.56
2.06
you saw/heard?
5. Sndlocal – To what extent did
it seem that sounds came from
2.70
1.49
3.50
1.93
specific, different locations?
6. Touchsmg – How often did
you want or try to touch
1.35
.60
1.87
1.7
something you saw/heard?
7. Window – Did the experience
seem more like looking at the
events/people on a movie screen
or more like looking at the
2.41
1.80
3.06
2.17
events/people through a
window.
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050

128

Table C9
Means for individual Engagement (mental immersion) presence items (Lombard &
Ditton, 2000) in the Experimental condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation.
Attitudes were measured a 1-7 point scales, and one semantic differential.
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Mentalim – To what extent
did you feel mentally immersed
1.50
1.24
3.88*
4.94*
in the experience?
2. Involving – How involving
was the experience?
1.26
1.27
4.12*
5.00*
3. Senseeng – How completely
were your senses engaged?
1.36
1.17
3.56*
5.47*
4. Sensreal – To what extent did
you experience a sensation of
reality?
1.51
1.71
3.00*
4.76*
5. Exciting – How relaxing or
exciting was the experience?
3.25
1.69
3.88
1.41
6. How engaging was the story?
1.36
1.05
4.88*
6.11*
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050
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Table C10
Means for individual Engagement (mental immersion) presence items (Lombard &
Ditton, 2000) in the Control condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes
were measured a 1-7 point scales, and one semantic differential.
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Mentalim – To what extent
did you feel mentally immersed
1.53
1.78
3.29*
5.00*
in the experience?
2. Involving – How involving
was the experience?
1.49
1.41
3.88*
4.87*
3. Senseeng – How completely
were your senses engaged?
4.06
1.64
4.94
1.12
4. Sensreal – To what extent did
you experience a sensation of
.97
1.28
3.23**
4.81**
reality?
5. Exciting – How relaxing or
exciting was the experience?
1.07
1.57
4.17*
5.25*
6. How engaging was the story?
.99
.72
5.12**
6.44**
Note. **p<.001. *p<.050
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Table C11
Means for individual Social realism presence items (Lombard & Ditton, 2000) in the
Experimental condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured
a 1-7 point scales, and one semantic differential.
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Ocrworld – The way in
which the events I saw/heard
occurred is a lot like the way
4.63
1.67
4.82
1.63
they occur in the real world.
2. Couldocr – The events I
saw/heard could occur in the
5.75
1.00
5.94
1.51
real world.
3. Wouldocr – The events I
saw/heard would occur in the
3.50
1.21
4.29
1.44
real world.
Note. **p<.050. *p<.001
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Table C12
Means for individual Social realism presence items (Lombard & Ditton, 2000) in the
Control condition, grouped by high vs. low transportation. Attitudes were measured a 1-7
point scales, and one semantic differential.
Variable
Low Transportation
High Transportation
M
SD
M
SD
1. Ocrworld – The way in
which the events I saw/heard
occurred is a lot like the way
1.52
1.72
3.94*
5.18*
they occur in the real world.
2. Couldocr – The events I
saw/heard could occur in the
1.65
.79
5.12*
6.31*
real world.
3. Wouldocr – The events I
saw/heard would occur in the
1.39
1.63
2.76*
4.56*
real world.
Note. **p<.050. *p<.001
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